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INTRODUCTION 
Police officer misconduct records1 are protected from public disclosure in the 
vast majority of states.2 Many states also make these records very difficult for 
criminal defendants to obtain, even when the officers who are the subject of these 
records are key witnesses in a prosecution against those defendants.3 Misconduct 
records may contain information ranging from claims of excessive force to planting 
evidence to arriving late or intoxicated to work. The common justification for 
denying access to these records is that police officers have a privacy interest in the 
content of the records.4 When in 2018 the New York Police Department—which 
has for the past several years refused to disclose even anonymized police 
misconduct records5—floated a proposal to release redacted information about its 
disciplinary process, the city’s largest police union immediately sued to halt the 
 
1. I use the term “misconduct records” to denote information regarding allegations or findings 
of police misconduct that is within the possession of a police department or governmental agency 
responsible for assessing police misconduct. These records may include, inter alia, complaints lodged 
by civilians against police officers, internal affairs reports, disciplinary findings against officers, 
performance evaluations, and, in some jurisdictions, body camera footage or other  
technology recording possible instances of misconduct by officers. See Jonathan Abel, Brady’s  
Blind Spot: Impeachment Evidence in Police Personnel Files and the Battle Splitting the Prosecution Team,  
67 STAN. L. REV. 743, 745 (2015); Kate Levine, Discipline and Policing, 68 DUKE L.J. 839, 859–60 
(2019) (describing the impossibility of providing a precise definition for police disciplinary records 
because jurisdictions do not take a uniform approach to such records); Cynthia Conti-Cook, A New 
Balance: Weighing Harms of Hiding Police Disciplinary Records from the Public, 22 CUNY L. REV. 148, 
152 (2019) (providing similar definition of police misconduct “information”). Although Abel and 
Levine have written about “personnel” records and “disciplinary” records, I avoid those terms because 
they are at once broader and narrower than misconduct records. Personnel records tend to contain far 
more information than that specifically pertaining to police misconduct, and disciplinary records are 
limited to those in which discipline was actually imposed. 
2. For a helpful breakdown of each state’s laws regarding disclosure of police personnel records, 
see Robert Lewis et al., Is Police Misconduct a Secret in Your State?, WNYC (Oct. 15, 2015), 
https://www.wnyc.org/story/police-misconduct-records/ [https://perma.cc/ZSK4-YXHP]. A few 
states, most notably California, have amended their disclosure laws in the years since this compilation 
was published. These amendments are discussed where relevant below. 
3. See Rachel Moran, Contesting Police Credibility, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1339, 1368–76; Jeffrey  
F. Ghent, Annotation, Accused’s Right to Discovery or Inspection of Records of Prior Complaints Against, 
or Similar Personnel Records of, Peace Officer Involved in the Case, 86 A.L.R. Fed. 3d 1170, §2(a)  
(Supp. 2017). Examples of statutes denying or imposing obstacles to defendants’ access to these records 
include N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50-a (McKinney 2014) and 20 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1923(d) 
(2018). 
4. Infra Part I. 
5. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50-a; Robert Lewis, When a Cop’s Right to Privacy Undermines Our 
Right to a Fair Trial, WNYC (Oct. 14, 2015), https://www.wnyc.org/story/when-a-cops-right-to-
privacy-undermines-our-right-to-a-fair-trial/ [https://perma.cc/RQ3AHXSQ]; Rick Rojas, Suit 
Challenges Secrecy on New York Police Disciplinary Records, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2016), https://
www.nytimes.com/2016/12/06/nyregion/nypd-disciplinary-records.html [https://perma.cc/WF9A-
SELH]. 
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release on grounds that disclosure of these records would constitute a breach of the 
officers’ privacy.6  
Similar scenarios are playing out all over the country. In California, a 
controversial state statute has for decades prevented disclosure of law enforcement 
misconduct records to the public on the basis that disclosing this information would 
constitute an “unwarranted invasion of [law enforcement officers’] personal 
privacy.”7 Although the legislature amended the statute in late 2018 to permit 
disclosure of some records,8 as the law previously stood, not even prosecutors 
relying on these officers as witnesses had access to the records.9 In early 2019, a 
Kentucky lawmaker proposed a bill to restrict public access to police misconduct 
records, arguing that the bill was necessary to protect the officers’ privacy and 
prevent retaliatory action.10 When a Honolulu newspaper sought access to the 
misconduct records of several local police officers, the police department refused.11 
After the newspaper sued for access, the case wound its way up to the Hawaii 
Supreme Court, where the court concluded that police officers have a “significant 
privacy interest” in their misconduct records, and the records could be disclosed 
only after a showing that the public interest in access outweighs this privacy right.12 
In many other states, police misconduct records are withheld from the public under 
a privacy exemption to the state open records act.13 
 
6. Verified Petition, Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n of N.Y. v. de Blasio, 171 A.D.3d 636  
(N.Y. 2019) (No. 1), https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Patrolman-v-
DeBlasio.pdf [https://perma.cc/YSE8-PHAR]; Mike Hayes & Kendall Taggart, The NYPD Announces 
An Independent Panel Will Review Its Disciplinary Program, BUZZFEED NEWS ( June 21, 2018), https:/
/www.buzzfeed.com/mikehayes/nypd-disciplinary-review-board-created?utm_term=.nsZdPDQ5R 
#.oyQx9dLkv [https://perma.cc/S9LV-98GC]. 
7. Cal. Penal Code §§ 832.7, .8 (2018); see also Liam Dillon & Maya Lau, Gov. Jerry Brown Signs 
Landmark Laws That Unwind Decades of Secrecy Surrounding Police Misconduct, Use of Force, L.A. TIMES 
(Sep. 30, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-police-misconduct-rules-changed-2018 
0930-story.html?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter# [https://perma.cc/4QS4-GFQH].  
8. See S.B. 1421 (Cal. 2019). Senate Bill 1421, which took effect in January 2019, modified 
California’s statute to permit public access to investigations into officer shootings and other major uses 
of force, as well as confirmed incidents of officers lying on duty or committing sexual assault.  
The new law has met immediate legal challenges. See Walnut Creek Police Officers Ass’n  
v. City of Walnut Creek, 33 Cal. App. 5th 940 (2019), https://www.aclunc.org/docs/
SB_1421_Order_2.8.2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/4YUX-MJF3]; Liam Dillon, California Attorney 
General Sued Over Release of Records of Police Shootings and Misconduct Probes, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2019), 
https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-becerra-police-records-suit-20190214-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/Y7YX-2UCA]. 
9. Ass’n for L.A. Deputy Sheriffs v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. App. 5th 413, 436–39 (2017),  
judgment reversed and remanded, Ass’n for L.A. Deputy Sheriffs v. Superior Court, 251 Cal.Rptr.3d 320 
(Cal. 2019)).  
10. Deborah Yetter, Major Effort to Restrict Access to Kentucky Open Records Proposed,  
LA. COURIER J. ( Jan. 7, 2019), https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/2019/01/07/kentucky-
bill-limits-open-records-access-law/2503148002 [https://perma.cc/C2AR-8TYE]. 
11. Peer News LLC v. City of Honolulu, 138 Haw. 53, 55 (2016). 
12. Id. 
13. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 11, CH. 92, §9200(d) (2018); D.C. CODE §2-534 (2018);  
MD. CODE ANN., GENERAL PROVISIONS §§ 4-301, -311 (2018) (declaring personnel records 
“confidential”); see also Lewis et al., supra note 2 (summarizing each state’s approach to disclosure of 
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The notion of police officers’ right to privacy is frequently invoked and rarely 
examined. Many scholars have identified controversies surrounding a variety of 
other legal protections for police officers that may insulate the officers from public 
accountability.14 Some have called for increased transparency and public access to 
policing policies,15 while others have suggested that the protections police officers 
receive should be afforded to ordinary civilians as well.16 But there is a notable 
dearth of legal scholarship analyzing what police officers’ purported right to privacy 
actually means, particularly in the context of misconduct records. When police 
departments, government agencies, and courts refuse to disclose police misconduct 
records on grounds that disclosure would violate officers’ right to privacy, this 
justification is too often taken at face value.  
This Article provides a unique contribution to the scholarly literature by 
examining the commonly proffered privacy justification for refusing to disclose 
police misconduct records through the lens of privacy theory. The Article 
scrutinizes what advocates on both sides of the spectrum, arguing for privacy or 
transparency in police misconduct records, do not: whether and to what extent 
privacy law supports the non-disclosure of police misconduct records.  
The Article begins by placing this issue in its real-world context: an increasingly 
heated dispute over a once rarely questioned assumption, that police misconduct 
records are a private matter and should not be subject to public scrutiny. Part I sets 
out the present-day disagreements between police accountability advocates seeking 
to lift the veil on opaque disciplinary decisions and police privacy proponents who 
vehemently resist efforts to increase transparency.  
Part II transitions into a historical discussion of privacy law from both judicial 
and scholarly perspectives and particularly examines developing understandings of 
informational privacy: that is, privacy in recorded information about oneself. Rather 
than immediately zeroing in on police records, Part II provides the reader a primer 
regarding privacy rights more generally: the kinds of acts and information courts 
and scholars deem private and the philosophical bases for recognizing rights to 
privacy in these varied contexts. It then segues into an analysis of limitations on the 
 
police misconduct records); Levine, supra note 1, 868–69 (collecting various state approaches to privacy 
of police disciplinary records). 
14. See, e.g., Devon Carbado, Blue-On-Black Violence, 104 GEO. L.J. 1479, 1505–08 (2016); 
Catherine L. Fisk & L. Song Richardson, Police Unions, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 712, 717 (2017) 
(“Perhaps no issue has been more controversial in the discussion of police union responses to 
allegations of excessive force than statutory and contractual protections for officers accused of 
misconduct . . . .”); Kevin M. Keenan & Samuel Walker, An Impediment to Police Accountability? An 
Analysis of Statutory Law Enforcement Officers’ Bills of Rights, 14 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 185, 186 (2005); 
Kate Levine & Stephen Rushin, Interrogation Parity, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1685, 1686–88 (2018); Stephen 
Rushin & Atticus DeProspo, Interrogating Police Officers, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 646 (2019); Lindsey 
Webb, Legal Consciousness as Race Consciousness, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 403, 410–20 (2018). 
15. Fisk & Richardson, supra note 14 (labeling transparency in police misconduct records as 
“clearly desirable”); Keenan & Walker, supra note 14 (arguing that the public’s need for truth and 
accountability trumps officers’ desire for “special protections”). 
16. Levine & Rushin, supra note 14. 
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right to informational privacy and discusses the limited categories of information 
traditionally protected by the right to privacy. 
Part III applies the discussion of privacy law to the current controversy over 
police misconduct records. Part III.A. begins by analyzing whether police officers 
have a legally cognizable right to privacy in their misconduct records, which requires 
comparing misconduct records to the types of information courts and scholars 
consistently recognize as private. This Part also assesses whether police officers’ 
status as public actors affects the kinds of information that are and should be 
deemed private.  
After considering whether officers have a cognizable right to privacy, Part 
III.B. then pivots to how courts and government agencies should balance privacy 
rights against the interests of other parties seeking access to misconduct records. In 
particular, Part III.B. considers five interests that should factor into this balancing 
test: (1) the governmental interest in ensuring accountability of employees in 
positions of trust; (2) the right of the public to protect itself from abusive officers; 
(3) the interest in protecting privacy rights of civilians; (4) the governmental interest 
in effective decision-making regarding public employees; and (5) in the context of 
criminal litigation specifically, the right of defendants to access exculpatory 
information. 
Lastly, Part IV recognizes the outcome-oriented concerns voiced by those 
who oppose granting access to police misconduct records. Although this article is 
primarily concerned with analyzing the validity of police privacy claims from a legal 
theory standpoint, fears about the practical effect of disclosure on both police 
officers and policing reform efforts cannot be ignored, and thus the article closes 
by addressing those issues.  
I. DISPUTES REGARDING DISCLOSURE OF POLICE MISCONDUCT RECORDS 
Laws preventing disclosure of police misconduct records are typically 
traceable to police unions, which have for decades served as powerful lobbying 
organizations and friends of politicians seeking to present themselves as “tough on 
crime.”17 In the 1970s, the California legislature, at the urging of police unions 
angered that complaints of officer misconduct were serving as fodder for 
impeachment of the officers in criminal cases, passed what was widely considered 
 
17. E.g., Conti-Cook, supra note 1 (“Police union rhetoric supporting secrecy of misconduct 
records heavily cites to privacy and safety concerns of officers . . . .”); Cynthia Conti-Cook, Defending 
the Public: Police Accountability in the Courtroom, 46 SETON HALL L. REV. 1063, 1070 (2016); 
Liam Dillon (@dillonliam), TWITTER (Aug. 31, 2018), https://twitter.com/dillonliam/status/103561 
7567174344704?s=11 [https://perma.cc/PBN5-ECCF]; Nick Grube, In the Name of the Law: Hawaii 
Police Union ‘Outguns’ Students, HONOLULU CIV. BEAT (Feb. 20, 2013), http://www.civilbeat.org/
2013/02/in-the-name-of-the-law-hawaii-police-union-outguns-students/ [https://perma.cc/M46C-
PEWX]; Kendall Taggert & Mike Hayes, Secret NYPD Files: Officers Who Lie and Brutally Beat People 
Can Keep Their Jobs, BUZZFEED NEWS (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.buzzfeed.com/kendalltaggart/
secret-nypd-files-hundreds-of-officers-committed-serious?utm_term=.qumQJgADK#.fjrOLAKaz 
[https://perma.cc/RQ4S-ZDSG]. 
First to Printer_Moran (Do Not Delete) 10/29/2019  1:35 PM 
158 U.C. IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:153 
the most extreme law enforcement records law in the country.18 The statute 
prevented disclosure of police misconduct records not just to the public but also to 
prosecutors.19  
New York’s Civil Rights Law Section 50-a, also enacted in the 1970s, provides 
that law enforcement performance records shall be “considered confidential and 
not subject to inspection or review” except by express consent of the police officer 
whose records are at issue.20 Much like the California legislature, the New York 
legislature passed this law “as a safeguard against potential harassment of 
officers.”21 The New York Court of Appeals interprets Section 50-a as preventing 
police departments from disclosing even redacted misconduct records that contain 
no identifying information about the officers involved.22 
While states take varied approaches to disclosure of police misconduct 
records, thirty-eight of the fifty states have enacted statutes protecting some or all 
of these records from disclosure to the public.23 Delaware singles out law 
enforcement records for special protective status, broadly excluding police 
personnel records or internal investigation files into police misconduct from public 
disclosure outside the litigation context.24 Idaho exempts from public disclosure the 
personnel records of all public officials or employees.25 Maryland similarly protects 
personnel records from public disclosure and precludes release of internal affairs 
records regarding police misconduct.26  
 
18. See Katherine Bies, Let the Sunshine In: Illuminating the Powerful Role Police Unions Play in 
Shielding Officer Misconduct, 28 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 109, 126–28 (2017); Liam Dillon, Here’s How 
California Became the Most Secretive State on Police Misconduct, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2018), http://
www.latimes.com/politics/la-me-california-police-discipline-secret-20180815-story.html# [https:// 
perma.cc/5GDS-8MJ2]. This law was amended, effective January 1, 2019, to permit disclosure of 
certain police misconduct records. See S.B. 1421 (Cal. 2019). 
19. Ass’n for L.A. Deputy Sheriffs v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. App. 5th 413, 436–39 (2017),  
cert. granted, 403 P.3d 144 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2017). The statute was amended in 2018 to permit disclosure of 
certain records but otherwise remains in full effect. See Cal. Penal Code §§ 832.7, .8; S.B. 1421  
(Cal. 2019). 
20. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50-a(1) (adopted in 1976). 
21. Daily Gazette Co. v. City of Schenectady, 93 N.Y.2d 145, 154 (1999); Prisoners’ Legal  
Servs. v. N.Y. State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 73 N.Y.2d 26, 31–32 (1988); Bies, supra note 18, at 
131–34. 
22. In re N.Y. Civ. Liberties Union v N.Y. City Police Dep’t, No. 08423  
(N.Y. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.nycourts.gov/ctapps/Decisions/2018/Dec18/133opn18-
Decision.pdf [https://perma.cc/H7W2-9SWM]; Hon. Mary Jo White et al., The Report of the 
Independent Panel on the Disciplinary System of the New York City Police Department ( Jan. 25, 2019), 
https://www.independentpanelreportnypd.net/assets/report.pdf [https://perma.cc/5DZE-PV6F]. 
23. See Lewis et al., supra note 2 (indicating that thirty-eight of the fifty states either entirely or 
partially protect police misconduct records from disclosure to the public). Although a few states have 
modified their records disclosure laws since this summary was published in 2015, it is still the most 
accurate published fifty-state summary available. Each of the statutes cited below have been 
independently reviewed for accuracy. 
24. DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 11, CH. 92, §9200(d) (2018).  
25. IDAHO CODE § 74-106(1) (2018). 
26. MD. CODE ANN., GENERAL PROVISIONS §§ 4-301, -311 (2018); Md. Dep’t of State Police 
v. Dashiell, 443 Md. 435, 439, 448, 458–59 (2015); see also MISS. CODE ANN. § 25-1-100 (2015) 
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Other states permit disclosure of some police misconduct records but only in 
limited circumstances. Vermont’s statutory scheme provides for public disclosure 
of the names of police officers who were charged and disciplined for misconduct 
but precludes access to records of complaints that were not sustained or internal 
affairs investigations into those complaints.27 Several states allow limited disclosure 
of disciplinary records only when a public employee has been discharged or 
demoted as a result of disciplinary action.28  
“Privacy” is nearly always invoked as the justification for non-disclosure laws. 
Some courts rely on officer privacy as the basis for prohibiting public disclosure of 
misconduct records.29 Other jurisdictions explicitly incorporate privacy language 
into the calculus of what types of records may be disclosed.30 Although these 
statutes typically exempt records when disclosure would “constitute an unwarranted 
invasion of personal privacy,” the statutes do not define or otherwise resolve the 
question of what constitutes an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.31  
Non-disclosure advocates also rely on privacy as a basis to push for or 
maintain strict disclosure laws. In 2017, after the NYPD released body-worn camera 
footage of officers involved in on-duty fatal shootings of civilians, the Patrolmen’s 
Benevolent Association sued to prevent disclosure of camera footage, arguing that 
disclosure violated “very serious” privacy interests of police officers.32 When the 
Chicago Tribune attempted to obtain information about complaints civilians had 
filed against Chicago police officers, the Fraternal Order of Police argued that the 
 
(exempting personnel records from public access); OR. REV. STAT. § 192.345(12) (2018) (exempting 
from disclosure “personnel discipline action” or any records pertaining to such action);  
38 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 38-2-2(4)(A)(I)(b) (exempting personnel records); VA. Code Ann. § 2.2-3705.1(1) 
(2017) (exempting personnel records); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 16-4-203 (2018) (exempting personnel 
records). 
27. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 1923(d), 2409 (2018).  
28. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 22.7(11)(a)(5) (2018) (permitting disclosure of disciplinary records 
resulting in discharge or demotion); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-98(a)–(b) (2018) (protecting personnel 
files and disciplinary records from disclosure, but permitting disclosure of limited information 
pertaining to dismissal, suspensions, or demotions); OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 24A.7 (making personnel 
and disciplinary records confidential except to the extent they pertain to “final disciplinary action 
resulting in loss of pay, suspension, demotion of position, or termination”); 65 PA. STAT. AND  
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 67.708(b)(7) (2009) (exempting information pertaining to criticism, demotion, 
discipline, or discharge, except for the “final action of an agency that results in demotion or discharge”). 
29. See Dashiell, 443 Md. at 461, 465 n.17. 
30. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-210(b)(2) (2013); D.C. CODE § 2-534(a)(3) (2018);  
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §15.243(1)(a), (b) (2018); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 91-A:5(IV) (2018). 
31. § 1-210(b)(2) (2013) (exempting personnel records from disclosure to the public if such 
disclosure would constitute an “invasion of personal privacy”); § 2-534(a)(3) (2018) (exempting records 
of investigations conducted by the Office of Police Complaints, to the extent disclosure of such records 
would “[c]onstitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy”); § 15.243(1)(a), (b) (2018) (precluding 
disclosure of personal information or law enforcement investigative records that would “constitute a 
clearly unwarranted invasion of . . . privacy”); § 91-A:5(IV) (2018) (exempting personnel records “and 
other files whose disclosure would constitute invasion of privacy”). 
32. See Verified Petition/Complaint ¶¶ 1, 4, 6-7 Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n of N.Y. v. de 
Blasio, 171 A.D.3d 636 (N.Y. 2019), https://www.politico.com/states/f/?id=00000160-db85-dcd4-
a96b-ffad8b6e0000 [https://perma.cc/2QPL-UEUU]. 
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officers’ “privacy rights” precluded release of the records.33 Law enforcement 
officers in Baltimore have echoed the same concern, complaining that release of 
police disciplinary records would “invade the privacy of officers and their 
families.”34  
As the California legislature and executive branch over the past several years 
debated whether to permit disclosure of law enforcement personnel records, police 
unions repeatedly invoked officer privacy as a reason to bar disclosure.35 The 
Ventura County District Attorney argued that a proposed bill granting public access 
to investigative files into officer misconduct would “give peace officers lesser 
privacy rights in investigation files than those afforded murderers, pedophiles, and 
other criminals.”36 South Dakota’s attorney general recently refused to identify the 
name of an officer who shot a civilian, reasoning that because the officer may have 
been acting in self-defense, he qualified as a crime victim and thus disclosure of his 
name would violate his right to privacy.37 Police privacy proponents argue that 
disclosure of misconduct records would embarrass officers, expose them to 
unwarranted misconduct allegations, and cause the public to unfairly judge them 
without all relevant facts.38 
 
33. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 7 v. City of Chicago, 2016 IL App (1st) 143884, ¶ 29 
(2016). 
34. See Justin Fenton, Baltimore Police Disciplinary Records Remain Shielded Despite Revelations 
of Misconduct, BALT. SUN (Feb. 17, 2018), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/crime/bs-
md-ci-police-records-transparency-20180214-story.html [https://perma.cc/6475-SWY8]. 
35.  S.B. 1286, Proposed Senate Bill, SB-1286, Peace officers: records of misconduct  
(Cal. 2016), http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160SB1286 
[https://perma.cc/GJ76-LD7L];S. COMM. PUB. SAFETY, B. ANALYSIS, S.B. 1286 (Cal. 2016), https:/
/spsf.senate.ca.gov/sites/spsf.senate.ca.gov/files/sb_1286_analysis.pdf [https://perma.cc/XVJ6-2A 
X4] (listing California law enforcement unions opposing proposed reforms to records  
disclosure law); Dillon, supra note 18; Patrick McGreevy, Lawmaker Proposes Giving 
Public Access to Police Shooting and Misconduct Cases , L.A. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2016),  http://
www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-cop-records-story.html [https://perma.cc/9U29-JJN7]; James 
Queally, California Police Uphold Few Complaints of Officer Misconduct and Investigations Stay Secret,  
L.A. TIMES (Sep. 23, 2018), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-police-misconduct-
complaints-20180923-story.html# [https://perma.cc/78V3-NE3Y]. 
36. S. COMM. PUB. SAFETY, S.B. 1286, at 15 (Cal. 2016). 
37. Arielle Zionts, Citing Marsy’s Law, State Won’t Release Name of Trooper Who Shot Man, 
RAPID CITY J. (Oct. 19, 2018), https://rapidcityjournal.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/citing-
marsy-s-law-state-won-t-release-name-of/article_910cf964-28f6-5328-bae7-554d67e1e999.html 
[https://perma.cc/PA5K-UDA9]. 
38. Darrel W. Stephens, Police Discipline: A Case for Change, NEW PERS. POLICING 1, 8–9 
( 2011); Dartunorro Clark, State Law Keeps Police Files Shrouded in Secrecy, TIMES UNION (Mar. 15, 
2015), http://www.timesunion.com/tuplus-local/article/State-law-keepspolice-files-shrouded-in-
secrecy-6134788.php. [https://perma.cc/V7C4-FUSQ]; Fenton, supra note 34; Melody Gutierrez, 
Stephon Clark Killing Prompts Bid to Open Police Disciplinary Records, S.F. CHRON. (Apr. 9, 2018), 
https://www.sfchronicle.com/politics/article/Stephon-Clark-killing-prompts-bid-to-open-police-
12816652.php?psid=mdkXi [https://perma.cc/PBJ2-MDEL]; Kasia Hall, Police Discipline Still 
Hidden Behind Closed Doors, ORANGE CTY. REG. (Aug. 14, 2012), https://www.ocregister.com/ 
2012/08/14/police-discipline-still-hidden-behind-closed-doors/https://www.ocregister.com/ 
2012/08/14/police-discipline-still-hidden-behind-closed-doors/ [https://perma.cc/8DXV-9J3V]. 
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Police unions almost universally oppose measures to increase transparency 
and public oversight of officers,39 and many lawmakers, reluctant to ruffle the 
feathers of a powerful and unified voting bloc, concede to the unions’ demands.40 
Nonetheless, a growing movement has formed in recent years against laws 
precluding disclosure of police misconduct records.41 Although California had long 
been the epicenter of these disputes even before its 2018 amendment permitting 
disclosure of certain records,42 two recent events in particular brought the issue to 
the forefront of activists’ and lawmakers’ agendas. The first involved an exposé of 
the Riverside Police Department, after leaked internal affairs documents revealed 
that numerous officers had cheated on a promotion exam, but none were demoted 
or fired.43 Two months after that revelation, Stephon Clark’s shooting death at the 
hands of Sacramento police officers—which garnered national attention in part 
because Clark was unarmed in his grandmother’s backyard when the officers 
 
39. E.g., Dillon, supra note 18; Liam Dillon (@dillonliam), TWITTER (Aug. 31, 2018, 12:57 PM), 
https://twitter.com/dillonliam/status/1035617567174344704?s=11 [https://perma.cc/RCY6-
GSFE] (showing amount of money L.A. police union donated to California state legislators in advance 
of vote on proposed bill to amend statute preventing disclosure of police disciplinary records); John 
Sullivan et al., In Fatal Shootings by Police, 1 in 5 Officers’ Names Go Undisclosed, WASH. POST (Apr. 1, 
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/in-fatal-shootings-by-police-1-in-5-officers-
names-go-undisclosed/2016/03/31/4bb08bc8-ea10-11e5-b0fd-073d5930a7b7_story.html [https:// 
perma.cc/3YZ3-SR5S] (discussing the “powerful voice” of police unions opposing disclosure of the 
names of officers who shot and killed civilians). The case has been made that police unions’ invocation 
of a right to privacy is not sincere, and instead is simply an excuse for maintaining power and opposing 
reform. See Cynthia Conti-Cook, Open Data Policing, 104 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 14 (2017), https://
georgetownlawjournal.org/articles/243/open-data-policing/pdf [https://perma.cc/RRW5-5AQH] 
(arguing that the real reasons police unions and departments oppose transparency in policing data 
“include liability, protecting its members from discipline, and retaining power over the narrative of 
policing”). Although there is certainly room for debate on this topic, it is not the subject of this paper. 
Instead, I focus this paper on analyzing the privacy concern’s legal viability. 
40. Stephen Rushin, Police Union Contracts, 66 DUKE L.J. 1191, 1215–16 (2017) (“Police unions 
are . . . a powerful political constituency.”); Seth Stoughton, The Incidental Regulation of  
Policing, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2179, 2206–17 (2014) (discussing the collective bargaining  
powers of various police unions across the country); Dillon, supra note 18; Grube, supra  
note 17; Gutierrez, supra note 38; Theodore Kupfer, Law-Enforcement Unions Have Too Much Power, 
NAT. REV. (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/02/law-enforcement-unions-
powerful-obstacle-criminal-justice-reform-fiscal-responsibility/ [https://perma.cc/B6YL-WVZW]; 
Ashley Southall, 4 Years After Eric Garner’s Death, Secrecy Law on Police Discipline  
Remains Unchanged, N.Y. TIMES ( Jun. 3, 2018), https://nytimes.com/2018/06/03/nyregion/police-
discipline-records-garner.html?smtyp=cur&smid=tw-nytimes [https://perma.cc/6TJK-9FSH].  
41. E.g., Ass’n for L.A. Deputy Sheriffs v. Superior Court, 403 P.3d 144, cert. granted, (Cal. 2017); 
Ass’n for L.A. Deputy Sheriffs v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. App. 5th 413, 436–39 (2017);  
In re N.Y. Civ. Liberties Union v. N.Y. City Police Dept., 50 N.Y.S.3d 365 (2017); Fraternal Order of 
Police, Lodge No. 7 v. City of Chicago, 2016 IL App (1st) 143884, ¶ 29; Fenton, supra note 34; see also 
Fisk & Richardson, supra note 14, at 750–51 (2017) (discussing recent legislative attempts to address 
controversies surrounding non-disclosure of police records). 
42.  S. COMM. PUB. SAFETY, S.B. 1286 (Cal. 2016).; Dillion, supra note 18. 
43. Bret Kelman, Twenty-Five Cops Were Caught Cheating on a Promotional Exam. Nobody  
Got Fired. Some Still Got Promoted, DESERT SUN (Feb. 8. 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
news/crime_courts/2018/02/08/twenty-five-cops-were-caught-cheating-promotional-exam-
nobody-got-fired-some-still-got-promoted/318222002/ [https://perma.cc/4RPN-QVY4]. 
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misidentified him as a burglary suspect—sparked renewed calls by Democratic 
legislators for amendments to the statute shielding misconduct records from 
release.44  
No data exists at a national level that can prove a causal connection between 
increasing public access to misconduct records and decreasing police misconduct.45 
But the intensifying demands for transparency in states that protect misconduct 
records from disclosure cannot be divorced from the recurring tragedy of police 
officers with hidden histories of violence killing people of color,46 nor from most 
police departments’ abysmal track records of holding officers accountable for 
wrongdoing.47 Chicago police officer Jason Van Dyke, who in 2018 was convicted 
of second-degree murder and sixteen counts of aggravated battery with a firearm 
for shooting and killing seventeen-year-old Laquan McDonald,48 had been accused 
 
44. Gutierrez, supra note 38; Sam Levin, Hundreds Dead, No One Charged: The Uphill Battle 
Against Los Angeles Police Killings, GUARDIAN (Aug. 24, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2018/aug/24/los-angeles-police-violence-shootings-african-american [https://perma.cc/ 
W3KG-M44B] (arguing that California’s strict confidentiality laws concerning police disciplinary 
records fostered a culture of excessive force).  
45. Anecdotal evidence suggests that public access to misconduct records can and does 
motivate improved responses to police misconduct. One example is the case of Chicago police officer 
Jason Van Dyke, who murdered Laquan McDonald. See infra note 49. Before a reporter sued for access 
to the body camera footage of Van Dyke shooting and killing McDonald, the City of Chicago had not 
so much as suspended Van Dyke; on the day of the video’s release, McDonald was charged with first-
degree murder. See Laquan McDonald: A Timeline of the Shooting, Fallout, and Officer Van Dyke’s Trial, 
CBS NEWS (Sep. 4, 2018), https://chicago.cbslocal.com/2018/09/04/laquan-mcdonald-shooting-
timeline-cpd-officer-jason-van-dyke-trial/ [https://perma.cc/368G-38VJ]; see also Tanya Eiserer,  
2 Dallas Deputy Police Chiefs Disciplined Over Handling of Actions Involving Fired Officers, 
DALL. NEWS (Mar. 2013), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/news/2013/03/09/2-dallas-deputy-
police-chiefs-disciplined-over-handling-of-actions-involving-fired-officers [https://perma.cc/DH6T-
5T7Q] (article detailing belated firing of Dallas police officers after expose by Dallas Morning News 
into their misconduct). 
46. See Thomas Barrabi, Who Is Daniel Pantaleo? NYPD Officer Who Killed  
Eric Garner Was Accused of Misconduct Before Chokehold Death, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2014), 
http://www.ibtimes.com/who-daniel-pantaleo-nypd-officer-who-killed-eric-garner-was-accused-
misconduct-1733094 [https://perma.cc/LNE2-VHGH] (noting that Officer Pantaleo, who killed Eric 
Garner, had been sued at least twice before on allegations of racially motivated misconduct); Donna 
Jackel, He Was Shot in the Back by a Cop… Then Spent 18 Months in Jail, NARRATIVELY ( July 2, 
2018), http://narrative.ly/he-was-shot-in-the-back-by-a-copthen-spent-18-months-in-jail/ [https:// 
perma.cc/J5AF-LJGP]; Ray Sanchez, Officer Michael Thomas Slager of South Carolina: What We Know 
About Him, CNN (Apr. 9, 2015), https://www.cnn.com/2015/04/08/us/south-carolina-michael-
slager/index.html [https://perma.cc/T58U-YB2B]; Jon Seidel, Police Review Authority Boss Ousted, 
CHI. SUN TIMES (Dec. 6, 2015), https://chicago.suntimes.com/2015/12/6/18420946/police-review-
authority-boss-ousted [https://perma.cc/B3C3-BL68]; Mitch Smith, Mayor of Chicago Announces 
Measures to Curb Use of Deadly Force by the Police, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2015), https://
www.nytimes.com/2015/12/31/us/mayor-rahm-emanuel-announces-measures-to-curb-use-of-
deadly-force-by-chicago-police.html [https://perma.cc/A5WT-L3YJ]; Timothy Williams & Mitch 
Smith, Cleveland Officer Will Not Face Charges in Tamir Rice Shooting Death, N.Y. TIMES  
(Dec. 28, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/29/us/tamir-rice-police-shootiing-
cleveland.html?smid=twnytimes&smtyp=cur&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/Y9G5-63D7]. 
47. See Rachel Moran, Ending the Internal Affairs Farce, 64 BUFF. L. REV. 837, 854–56 (2016). 
48. Mark Guarino & Mark Berman, Chicago Police Officer Jason Van Dyke Convicted of Second-
Degree Murder for Killing Laquan McDonald, WASH. POST (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.washingtonpo
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of misconduct in at least eighteen prior incidents, ranging from excessive force to 
use of racial slurs.49 Chicago police officer Patrick Kelly had been the subject of 
more than twenty-four investigations into inappropriate conduct both on- and off-
duty before he shot and severely injured a man in a drunken off-duty altercation.50 
Although an Illinois court ruled in 2014 that records of complaints filed against 
police officers were not protected from public disclosure, the records had in 
practice been exempt from disclosure for most of Van Dyke’s and Kelly’s careers.51  
New Jersey, which exempts police misconduct records from public 
disclosure,52 has also experienced serious misconduct-related scandals. Phillip 
Seidle, an officer in the Neptune Police Department in New Jersey was convicted 
of murdering his wife in 2015.53 Before the murder, Seidle had been the subject of 
twenty-six previous internal affairs investigations, and the police department had 
twice confiscated his service revolver due to concerns about inappropriate 
violence.54 In Bloomfield, New Jersey, a police officer who was sentenced to prison 
for battery of a civilian during a traffic stop had been the subject of at least thirty-
seven previous reports regarding his use of force against civilians.55 
In Maryland—another state that prohibits public access to police misconduct 
records56—eight members of Baltimore’s elite Gun Trace Task Force were recently 
convicted on a variety of federal charges stemming from incidents in which they 
stole money from civilians, tampered with evidence, committed warrantless raids, 





49. See Timothy Williams, Chicago Rarely Penalizes Officers for Complaints, Data Shows,  
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/19/us/few-complaints-against-
chicago-police-result-in-discipline-data-shows.html?smid=tw-nytimes&smtyp=cur&_r=0 [https:// 
perma.cc/9V5B-YKX7]. 
50. Jeff Coen & Stacy St. Clair, Judge Upholds Record $44.7 Million Jury Award in Michael 
LaPorta Case, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 30, 2018), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-
met-jury-award-upheld-kelly-20180830-story.html [https://perma.cc/F5ZR-99YN]. 
51. See Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 7 v. City of Chicago, 2016 IL App (1st) 143884, 
¶¶ 1, 36, 40; Kalven v. City of Chicago, 2014 IL App (1st) 12184, ¶¶ 22–31, overruled in unrelated part 
by Perry v. Dep’t of Financial and Professional Regulation, 2018 IL 122349. 
52. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-10 (2001). 
53. See MaryAnn Spoto, Former Neptune Cop Sentenced to 30 years in Prison for Fatal Shooting 
of Ex-Wife, NJ.COM (Sept. 30, 2016), https://www.nj.com/monmouth/index.ssf/2016/09/hold-
_hold-hold_suspended_neptune_cop_sentenced_to.html [https://perma.cc/7GKW-W7QP]. 
54. Andrew Ford, The Shield (Part 2), ASBURY  PARK  PRESS  (Jan. 22, 2018), https://
www.app.com/story/news/investigations/watchdog/shield/2018/01/22/philip-seidle-exclusive-
interview/109503924/ [https://perma.cc/D4SA-5Y6L]. 
55. Kala Kachmar & Andrew Ford, The Shield (Part 8), ASBURY PARK PRESS ( Jan. 22, 2018), 
https://www.app.com/story/news/investigations/watchdog/shield/2018/01/22/how-bad-cops-
made/1035150001/ [ https://perma.cc/5BC5-K5HT]. 
56. MD. CODE ANN., GENERAL PROVISIONS § 4-301, -311 (2018); Md. Dep’t of State Police 
v. Dashiell, 443 Md. 435, 439, 448, 458–59 (2015). 
57. Fenton, supra note 34. 
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had lengthy disciplinary histories to which the public was not privy.58 In response, 
Maryland’s Attorney General promised a “fresh look” at issues regarding 
“disclosure and transparency” of police misconduct records.59  
The NYPD has also experienced a crisis of confidence in recent years, in part 
due to revelations about officers committing misconduct with seeming impunity. 
In 2018, BuzzFeed News broke a series of stories regarding leaked internal affairs 
reports describing widespread and serious misconduct by officers who remained on 
the force.60 According to the reporters, investigative files showed that between 2001 
to 2015, “at least 319 New York Police Department employees who committed 
offenses serious enough to merit firing were allowed to keep their jobs.”61 The 
offenses included lying on official reports, lying under oath, lying during internal 
affairs investigations, cheating, stealing, assaulting civilians, using excessive force, 
fighting, threatening to kill someone, engaging in sexually inappropriate behavior 
with both minors and adults, running a prostitution ring, and firing a gun without 
cause.62 Manhattan’s District Attorney is now requesting that the police department 
provide the District Attorney with electronic access to police disciplinary files,63 and 
NYPD Police Commissioner James O’Neill has admitted that his police department 
had lost the trust of the community and needed to become more transparent in its 
disciplinary process.64 
Even in states that ostensibly grant public access to police misconduct records, 
police departments continue to cite privacy as a justification for not disclosing 
certain records. In Alabama—a state that does not formally exempt police 
misconduct records from public disclosure—the Huntsville police department has 
refused to disclose body camera footage showing an officer killing a civilian, citing 




60. See Mike Hayes, Two NYPD Officers Busted for Gambling and Prostitution Have a History of 
Misconduct, Records Show, BUZZFEED NEWS (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/
article/mikehayes/nypd-officers-gambling-prostitution-misconduct-records [https://perma.cc/PFE7-
KRBP]; Hayes & Taggart, supra note 6; Taggert & Hayes, supra note 17. 
61. Taggert & Hayes, supra note 17.  
62. Id.; Hayes, supra note 60.  
63. See James C. McKinley, Jr., Manhattan District Attorney Demands Access to Police Records, 
N.Y. TIMES ( July 8, 2018), https://mobile.nytimes.com/2018/07/08/nyregion/manhattan-district-
attorney-police-records.html [https://perma.cc/7UBE-L34Z]. 
64. Taggert & Hayes, supra note 17; see also Kenneth Lovett, Relatives of Those Who Died at 
Hands of Police Push for Repeal of NYS Law Shielding Release of Cop Disciplinary Records, N.Y. DAILY 
NEWS (Dec. 24, 2018), https://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/ny-pol-50a-police-discipline-
diallo-bell-garner-carr-20181223-story.html?outputType=amp&__twitter_impression=true 
[https://perma.cc/5RQL-KLGV]. 
65. Lauren Gill, A Grand Jury Indicted an Alabama Police Offficer for Murder. Then a Mayor 
Came to His Defense, APPEAL (Sept. 10, 2018), https://theappeal.org/a-grand-jury-indicted-an-
alabama-police-officer-for-murder-then-a-mayor-came-to-his-defense [https://perma.cc/9CLS-
44NJ]; see also ALA. CODE § 36-12-40 (providing public access to records in the possession of the state 
and no specific exemption for police misconduct records). 
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access to criminal justice records and investigatory files is left to the discretion of 
the custodian of those records,66 police departments routinely deny such records 
requests.67  
The landscape surrounding access to police misconduct records is widely 
varied, shifting, and subject to extensive and increasing criticism. What remains 
consistent is the justification at the center of nearly every dispute: privacy.  
II. PRIVACY: WHAT IT IS AND WHAT IT PROTECTS 
A. History and expansion of the right to privacy 
Privacy is a “highly contested concept” among legal scholars.68 The United 
States Constitution contains no explicit mention of a right to privacy. Most privacy 
theorists date the scholarly origins of the right to Samuel Warren and Louis 
Brandeis’s 1890, aptly titled article, The Right to Privacy.69 Privacy, according to 
Warren and Brandeis, was best described as the right to “enjoy life,” which 
fundamentally involved “the right to be let alone.”70 They envisioned a world in 
which privacy intrusions were committed primarily by journalists and 
photographers seeking to invade the “sacred precincts of private and domestic 
life.”71 For Warren and Brandeis, privacy rights were confined mostly (or perhaps 
entirely) to the home and were violated by those breaching the sacrosanct space of 
the home. 
 
66. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-72-302, -304-05 (2018). 
67. See Margaret Kwoka et al., Access Denied: Colorado Law Enforcement Refuses Public Access 
to Records of Police Misconduct, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3136011 
[https://perma.cc/LX8B-FL8M]. A new bill mandating that police misconduct records be made 
available for public inspection is now under consideration in the Colorado legislature. See H.B. 19-1119 
(Colo. 2019). 
68. Mary Ann Franks, Democratic Surveillance, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 425, 426 n.4 (2017); see 
also Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy As an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser,  
39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 962 (1964) (“Remarkably enough, there remains to this day considerable 
confusion concerning the nature of the interest which the right to privacy is designed to protect.”); Julie 
E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1911 (2013) (quoting JULIE E. COHEN, 
CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE 149 
(2012)); Hyman Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 34, 35 (1967) (describing privacy law 
as “infected with pernicious ambiguities”); Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance,  
126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1946 (2013); David Alan Sklansky, Too Much Information: How Not to Think 
About Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 102 CAL. L. REV. 1069, 1113 (2014); Daniel J. Solove, 
Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1088 (2002). 
69. Samuel Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890); see 
also Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233 (1977) (citing article as foundation 
of United States privacy law); Irwin P. Kramer, The Birth of Privacy Law: A Century Since Warren and 
Brandeis, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 703, 704–08 (1990) (describing lack of coherent legal approach to privacy 
violations before Warren and Brandeis’s article); Richard Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by 
the Supreme Court, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 173, 176 (1979); Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy,  
87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 400–01 (2008); Solove, supra note 68, at 1099–1100.  
70. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 69, at 193. 
71. Id. 
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Courts were slow to recognize privacy as a cognizable right.72 Although a few 
state courts after Warren and Brandeis’s article addressed the prospect of a right to 
privacy with mixed results,73 the United States Supreme Court remained mostly 
silent on the issue for many years.74 In 1928, Louis Brandeis himself, by then a 
justice on the Supreme Court, drafted a dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United 
States that complained of the majority’s unwillingness to recognize that government 
agents’ wiretappings of citizens’ phones constituted an “intrusion . . . on the privacy 
of the individual.”75 In 1952, Justice Douglas, also in dissent, suggested that a 
constitutional right to privacy should prevent public railway cars from broadcasting 
radio programs over their loudspeakers.76 But it was not until 1965 that the Court 
first explicitly recognized such a right in Griswold v. Connecticut.77  
The defendants in Griswold were convicted under a Connecticut law that 
criminalized using (or helping others use) contraceptive devices and challenged the 
law as unconstitutional.78 The Court, while noting that the Constitution does not 
expressly reference a right to privacy, reasoned that the First Amendment provides 
“a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion,” specifically 
within the right to freedom of association.79 Additionally, the right to privacy could 
be unearthed in “emanations from” the Third Amendment’s prohibition against 
forced quartering of soldiers in civilians’ homes, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments’ 
protections against governmental intrusion into the sanctity of home and life, and 
the Ninth Amendment’s protection of “rights retained by the people.”80 The Court 
ultimately concluded that the right of privacy in the marriage relationship was “a 
legitimate one.”81 While a 7-2 majority of the court reversed the convictions in 
Griswold, five of the seven majority justices wrote or joined in separate concurring 
opinions expressing widespread disagreement over the origins and existence of a 
constitutional right to privacy.82 This gallimaufry of approaches to privacy rights led 
 
72. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 69, at 177 (describing various torts such as “right of publicity” 
and “false light” that developed after publication of Warren and Brandeis’s article). 
73. See Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190 (1905) (recognizing a right to 
privacy); Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538 (1902) (rejecting claim based on a right 
to privacy); Atkinson v. John E. Doherty & Co., 80 N.W. 285 (Mich. 1899) (criticizing notion of a right 
to privacy); Corliss v. E.W. Walker Co., 64 F. 280 (Mass. Cir. Ct. 1894) (holding that a public figure 
cannot prevent publication of his portrait); see also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 867 (1939); Wilbur 
Larremore, The Law of Privacy, 12 COLUM. L. REV. 693, 694 (1912); William Prosser, Privacy, 48  
CAL. L. REV. 383, 386–87 (1960) (citing numerous cases for proposition that the majority of American 
courts had begun to recognize a right to privacy by the 1930s). 
74. Posner, supra note 69, at 177. 
75. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
76. Pub. Util. Comm’n of D.C. v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 467–69 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
77. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see also Posner, supra note 69, at 177 (positing 
that Griswold ushered in a new era of privacy law by recognizing a right to privacy “divorced from the 
specific privacy-oriented guarantees of the Bill of Rights”). 
78. 381 U.S. at 480–81. 
79. Id. at 483 (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958)). 
80. Id. at 484–85. 
81. Id. at 485. 
82. Id. at 486–507. 
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one scholar to bemoan Griswold as “thrown up in great haste, from a miscellany of 
legal rock and stone.”83 
Divided as the Griswold decision was, it is generally recognized as the 
foundation of a series of Supreme Court cases recognizing the “autonomy” strand 
of privacy theory.84 This controversial subsection of privacy theory involves the 
ability to maintain control over personal choices, specifically in “matters relating to 
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and 
education.”85 
A separate strand of privacy law, now recognized as the “confidentiality” 
strand,86 received its first meaningful analysis in the Supreme Court’s 1977 decision 
Whalen v. Roe.87 In Whalen, the Court was asked to decide whether a New York law, 
authorizing the state to maintain a database containing the names and addresses of 
everyone purchasing certain prescription drugs, posed an unconstitutional threat to 
the privacy of drug purchasers.88 In examining this issue the Court took its first step 
toward differentiating the autonomy and confidentiality branches of privacy theory, 
reasoning that the Court’s earlier decisions had “in fact involved at least two 
different kinds of interests. One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of 
personal matters, and another is the interest in independence in making certain 
kinds of important decisions.”89 While the autonomy branch of privacy theory 
stems from the latter interest, the confidentiality strain, in contrast, is grounded in 
Warren and Brandeis’s “right to be let alone” and “protected from governmental 
intrusion.”90 
The Whalen Court then decided that New York’s law did not 
unconstitutionally threaten either interest.91 Although the “accumulation of vast 
amounts of personal information” in electronic or paper databases necessarily 
created a threat to privacy that “arguably has its roots in the Constitution,” states 
can collect and use such data as needed for public purposes, as long as the statutory 
 
83. Gerety, supra note 69, at 233. 
84. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (expanding privacy rights to include the right to an 
abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (holding that the right of privacy in 
contraceptive choices extended to “the individual, married or single”). 
85. Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1559 (2d Cir. 1983) (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 
U.S. 693, 713 (1976)); see also Gerety, supra note 69, at 236 (defining privacy as “autonomy or control 
over the intimacies of personal identity”). 
86. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977); Barry, 712 F.2d at 1558; Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 
F.2d 1119, 1128 (5th Cir. 1978). 
87. Whalen, 429 U.S. 589. The Court also hinted at the confidentiality strand of privacy ten 
years earlier in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), a decision that rejected a defendant’s claim 
of a “general constitutional right to privacy.” Id. at 348–51. While Katz did reason that privacy rights 
were properly understood as a “right to be let alone,” it made no attempt to flesh out the contours of 
those rights. Id.   
88. 429 U.S. at 591–96. The data at issue in Whalen was accessible to the state but not private 
actors. Id. at 594, 601–02. 
89. Id. at 598–600. 
90. See id. at 599 n.25 (citing numerous authorities to explicate this point). 
91. Id. at 600. 
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scheme regulating such collection properly takes into account the individual interest 
in privacy.”92 Justice Brennan, concurring in the judgment, wrote separately to make 
clear he did not believe the Constitution provided “a general interest in freedom 
from disclosure of private information.”93 
B. Development of a right to informational privacy 
Around the same time the Supreme Court was engaged in nascent efforts to 
mold a coherent privacy doctrine, legal scholars also began to weigh in more 
earnestly on the definition of privacy. In his 1960 work Privacy, William Prosser 
theorized that the right to privacy encompassed four distinct torts, one of which 
was “public disclosure of private facts.”94 By the late 1960s and the dawn of the 
computer age, scholars and government officials were acutely and increasingly 
attuned to ways in which the government’s expanded capacity for data collection 
could affect traditional notions of privacy.95 When Hyman Gross published Concept 
of Privacy in 1967, he argued that the right to privacy included protections against 
disclosure of “the intimate facts of one’s life,” as well as “protection of confidential 
information—income tax information, census information, financial affairs, and the 
like.”96 In 1968, Charles Fried warned that “the burgeoning claims of public and 
private agencies to personal information, have created a new sense of urgency in 
defense of privacy.”97 In Fried’s eyes, privacy involved “not simply an absence of 
information about us in the minds of others; rather it is the control we have over 
information about ourselves.”98 By 1973, the U.S. Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare had issued a lengthy report examining concerns related to 
computerized information, acknowledging that such concerns centered around 
“implications for personal privacy, and understandably so if privacy is considered 
to entail control by an individual over the uses made of information about him.”99  
This was the backdrop of the Supreme Court’s 1977 decision in Whalen, which 
represented the Court’s first tentative embrace of a constitutional right to 
informational privacy. While Whalen never used the phrase “informational privacy,” 
it nonetheless acknowledged that governmental collection of data that is “personal 
in character and potentially embarrassing or harmful if disclosed” could threaten 
 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 606–09 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
94. Prosser, supra note 73, at 389. 
95. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE 
RIGHTS OF CITIZENS: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AUTOMATED 
PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS ix (1973), available at https://www.justice.gov/opcl/docs/rec-com-
rights.pdf [https://perma.cc/AG3H-FD4Z] (193-page report prepared by the U.S. Department of 
Health regarding the “changes in American society which may result from using computers to keep 
records about people”). 
96. Gross, supra note 68, at 34. 
97. Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 475 (1968). 
98. Id. at 482; see also id. at 483 (“Privacy . . . is control over knowledge about oneself.”). 
99. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, supra note 95, at xx. 
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the privacy of the subject of that data.100 However, the Whalen majority was careful 
not to reach any definitive conclusions as to the existence of a right to informational 
privacy, instead noting only that any privacy interest in personal data “arguably has 
its roots in the Constitution.”101 
In Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, decided the same term as Whalen, 
the Court agreed to hear another question about privacy of information.102 The 
Nixon Court considered whether the Presidential Recordings and Materials 
Preservation Act, permitting the government to publicly disseminate President 
Nixon’s papers and recordings, violated the president’s right to privacy.103 The 
Court began its privacy analysis by accepting Nixon’s concession that people who 
enter public life “voluntarily surrender[ ] the privacy secured by law for those who 
elect not to place themselves in the public spotlight.”104 The Court then said it “may 
agree” with Nixon’s argument that even public officials “are not wholly without 
constitutionally protected privacy rights in matters of personal life unrelated to any 
acts done by them in their public capacity.”105 The Court contrasted such 
information regarding “matters of personal life” with recordings that related to the 
work of the presidency, for which Nixon lacked any expectation of privacy and 
which the public had a legitimate interest in reviewing.106 Without explicitly 
embracing the existence of a constitutional right to informational privacy, the Court 
concluded that the Presidential Recordings Act did not violate any such right.107 
C. Limitations on the right to informational privacy 
In the forty years since Whalen and Nixon both alluded to a right to privacy in 
personal information but rejected the privacy claims at issue, the Supreme Court 
has continued to narrowly construe such a right.108 In the 2011 case NASA  
v. Nelson, the Court addressed a challenge brought by federal employees arguing 
that NASA’s policy of requiring employees to report drug treatment and counseling 
violated their privacy interest in “avoiding disclosure of personal matters.”109 The 
Court “assume[d], without deciding, that the Constitution protects a privacy right 
of the sort mentioned in Whalen and Nixon,” but held that NASA’s reporting 
policies did not violate that right.110 In so doing, the Court relied on the 
 
100. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977).  
101. Id. 
102. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977). 
103. Id. 
104. Id. at 455 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)). 
105. Id. at 457. 
106. Id. at 459, 462, 465. 
107. Id. at 457. 
108. See, e.g., Scott Skinner-Thompson, Outing Privacy, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 159, 161 (2015) 
(bemoaning the lack of definitive resolution regarding the extent of a constitutional interest in 
“informational privacy”). 
109. See NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 138 (2011).  
110. Id. at 147. 
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government’s “strong interest” in employing a reasonable and competent 
workforce, as well as the importance of the jobs NASA employees performed.111 In 
separate concurrences, Justices Thomas and Scalia expressed their belief that the 
Constitution does not bestow a right to informational privacy.112 
In summary, the Supreme Court has never definitively recognized a 
constitutional right to privacy of information but has hinted at such a right in the 
three cases discussed above.113 To the extent this right may exist, the Court has 
found it in only a limited class of cases involving records of drug use,114 drug 
treatment,115 and counseling.116 Even in these narrow contexts, the Court found no 
impermissible violation of a right to informational privacy, instead ruling that 
governmental interests in ensuring a strong workforce and competent employees, 
or tracking possible illicit drug use, trumped the right to privacy.117 The Court also 
rejected application of the right to information regarding public actors about which 
the populace has a legitimate concern.118 
Although most scholars recognize Whalen, Nixon, and Nelson as the Supreme 
Court’s three most prominent informational privacy decisions, the Court has also 
twice addressed informational privacy claims arising under the federal Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA).119 In Department of Air Force v. Rose, the Court was asked 
to interpret FOIA’s provision exempting from public access “personnel . . . files 
the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal 
privacy.”120 The Court concluded that the statute did not protect all personnel files 
from public disclosure but only those files the release of which would threaten an 
individual’s privacy for “clearly unwarranted” reasons.121 The Court also noted that 
the “clearly unwarranted” provision should be construed as a “limited exception” 
to the general rule mandating disclosure of personnel files.122 
The Court’s other major FOIA decision, United States Department of Justice  
v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of Press, addressed whether the FBI’s disclosure of 
private civilians’ criminal history records could “reasonably be expected to 
constitute” an “unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” under a separate 
subsection of FOIA dealing with records compiled for law enforcement 
 
111. Id. at 150–53. 
112. Id. at 159–69 (2011) (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring). 
113. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134; Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977); Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 
433 U.S. 425 (1977). 
114. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605. 
115. Nelson, 562 U.S. at 150–53. 
116. Id. 
117. Id.; Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598.  
118. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 457. 
119. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989); Dep’t 
of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976). 
120. Rose, 425 U.S. at 370. 
121. Id. at 371–72 (interpreting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6)). 
122. Id.  
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purposes.123 The records at issue included convictions, sentences, arrests, and 
charges that did not result in conviction.124 The Court construed this exemption 
more broadly than the personnel records provision, concluding that disclosure of 
rap sheets to private parties could reasonably be construed as implicating the interest 
in “avoiding disclosure of personal matters”125 because “both the common law and 
the literal understandings of privacy encompass the individual’s control of 
information concerning his or her person.”126 
While the Reporters Committee Court recognized a privacy interest in avoiding 
disclosure of personal information—and concluded that criminal history records 
constituted personal information for purposes of FOIA—it made no effort to 
ground its privacy discussion in any constitutional rights, instead relying on the text 
of FOIA and common practice surrounding non-disclosure of criminal history 
records.127 The Court also had no opportunity to analyze privacy interests in records 
of public employees, instead limiting its holding to the idea that “disclosure of 
records containing personal details about private citizens can infringe significant 
privacy interests.”128 
The federal circuit courts of appeal have also treated informational privacy 
claims with circumspection.129 Some have declined to recognize the right at all. The 
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, in the context of a policy requiring certain federal 
government employees to disclose information about finances, mental health, and 
illegal drug use, expressed “grave doubts” that a constitutional right to 
“nondisclosure of private information” exists but refused to decide the question 
because the policy would satisfy constitutional scrutiny even if such a right did 
exist.130 The First Circuit has also declined to decide whether a right to 
informational privacy exists, reasoning that, though the Supreme Court appears to 
have espoused a right to privacy in some forms of information, that right may 
extend only to matters affecting “the autonomy branch of the right of privacy”—
that is, marital and family relationships, procreation, and child-rearing.131 
Other circuits have recognized a constitutional right to informational privacy 
but limited the right to specific types of highly personal information, mostly 
involving medical, sexual, or financial records. The Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth 
Circuits have identified a right to privacy in “intimate and personal” records but 
 
123. Id. at 751 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (1982)). 
124. Id. at 752. 
125. Id. at 762 (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598–600 (1977)). 
126. Id. at 762–63. 
127. Id. at 763–70. 
128. Id. at 766. 
129. E.g., Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 118 F.3d 786  
(D.C. Cir. 1997); Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1559 (2d Cir. 1983); United States  
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577–78 (3d Cir. 1980); Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 
1135 (5th Cir. 1978). 
130. Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., 118 F.3d at 788, 791. 
131. Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 839–49 (1st Cir. 1987). 
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limited this category to medical and financial records and held that even these 
records can be disclosed if the public interest justifies an intrusion into the privacy 
right.132 The Second and Fifth Circuits have also concluded that release of 
information that is not “highly personal” does not violate the right to privacy.133 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has construed the right to informational privacy 
to encompass “only two instances: (1) where the release of personal information 
could lead to bodily harm, and (2) where the information released was of a sexual, 
personal, and humiliating nature.”134 The Seventh Circuit has more vaguely 
identified a privacy right to confidentiality in “certain types of information” but 
declined to apply that right to the context of a school psychologist arguing that his 
employment should not be conditioned on willingness to disclose information 
regarding student sexual abuse.135 The Eighth Circuit has recognized a right to 
informational privacy but held that the information disclosed must involve “either 
a shocking degradation or an egregious humiliation” to implicate a constitutional 
violation.136 The Ninth and Tenth Circuits have acknowledged a constitutional right 
 
132. Hancock v. Cty. of Rensselaer, 882 F.3d 58, 65 (2d Cir. 2018); Walls v. City of Petersburg, 
895 F.2d 188, 189–90, 192–94 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that a background check questionnaire for city 
police department employees, which contained questions about criminal and financial history, passed 
constitutional muster because the city had a compelling interest in guarding against police corruption 
and few people had access to the information); Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5 v. City of 
Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105, 112–14 (3d Cir. 1987) (agreeing that medical and financial information is 
intimate and should not be subjected to public scrutiny, but, nonetheless, permitting police departments 
to require officers to disclose this information when applying for certain positions); Barry, 712 F.2d at 
1558–62 (acknowledging a right to privacy in the context of laws requiring disclosure of financial 
information for city employees and political candidates, but holding that such right is outweighed by 
the government’s interest in deterring corruption); Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d at 577–80; Plante, 
575 F.2d at 1132–36 (acknowledging a right to privacy in the context of laws requiring disclosure of 
financial information for city employees and political candidates, but holding that such right is 
outweighed by the government’s interest in deterring corruption); see also Doe v. Borough of Barrington, 
729 F. Supp. 376, 382–84 (D.N.J. 1990) (police officers violated constitutional right against “disclosure 
of personal matters” when they disclosed that the plaintiff had AIDS). But see Paul P. v. Verniero, 170 
F.3d 396, 401–04 (3d Cir. 1998) (requirement that people convicted of certain sex offenses provide 
name, address, social security number, and other identifying information to law enforcement, which 
then disseminates information to the public, may have implicated “some nontrivial [privacy] interest,” 
but was justified by public interest in knowing where sex offenders live); Scheetz v. The Morning Call, 
Inc., 946 F.2d 202, 207 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding no right to privacy for information in police reports). 
133. Barry, 712 F.2d at 1558–62; Plante, 575 F.2d at 1132–36. 
134. Lee v. City of Columbus, 636 F.3d 245, 248, 260 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal citations omitted) 
(holding that sick leave policy requiring employees to tell supervisors about the nature of their illness 
did not implicate a right to informational privacy); Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d 433, 440 (6th  
Cir. 2008); see also Doe v. Wigginton, 21 F.3d 733, 740 (6th Cir.1994) (denying existence of right to 
privacy in medical records). 
135. Pesce v. J. Sterling Morton High Sch., 830 F.2d 789, 795–98 (7th Cir. 1987); see also Woods 
v. White, 689 F. Supp. 874, 876 (W.D. Wis. 1988) (noting circuit courts’ confusion over the existence 
and extent of a constitutional right to privacy of personal information, but concluding that privacy of 
information within medical records is “information of the most personal kind,” and therefore 
protected). 
136. Cooksey v. Boyer, 289 F.3d 513, 516 (8th Cir. 2002) (disclosure of fact that high-ranking 
police officer was receiving psychological treatment for stress did not violate officer’s right to privacy). 
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to privacy in some types of medical information, reasoning that medical records 
contain “intimate facts of a personal nature.”137  
Scholars also have endorsed mostly narrow understandings of informational 
privacy. Shortly after Whalen, Richard Posner imagined informational privacy rights 
as “invaded whenever private information is obtained against the wishes of the 
person to whom the information pertains”138 but specifically denoted information 
regarding “health or employment or credit or arrests.”139 Another early privacy 
scholar, Tom Gerety, reasoned that informational privacy rights must be interpreted 
narrowly to encompass only “such information as is necessary to the intimacies of 
our personal identities.”140 
Some scholars dispute that informational privacy should be recognized as a 
constitutional right. Mary Fan, criticizing its development as an assumed right, has 
referred to informational privacy as “affectively influenced intuition,” based 
primarily on a gut instinct that the law should provide a remedy against disclosure 
of certain information.141 Daniel Solove has also cautioned against reading too 
broadly into the right of privacy and noted that privacy violations generally are 
limited to intrusions upon body, family, and home.142  
Solove and Fan are far from the only privacy theorists to express concern over 
those too quick to label publication of information a violation of informational 
privacy rights. Scott Skinner-Thompson proposes that questions of informational 
privacy be assessed through the lens of two “more narrow and concrete values”: (1) 
creating space for political thought, and (2) preventing “intimate, personal 
information”—specifically sexual, medical, and mental health information—from 
serving as a basis to discriminate against the subject of the information.143 Helen 
Nissenbaum categorizes informational privacy as an effort to restrict “access to 
sensitive, personal, or private information.”144 According to Nissenbaum, the right 
to informational privacy extends to information which “meets societal standards of 
intimacy, sensitivity, or confidentiality.”145 Jeffrey Skopek summarizes 
informational privacy as encompassing “a type of information that others should 
not try to discover,” generally involving matters pertaining to intimacy or 
autonomy.146 
 
137. See Seaton v. Mayberg, 610 F.3d 530, 536–40 (9th Cir. 2010); Lankford v. City of Hobart, 
27 F.3d 477, 479 (10th Cir. 1994). 
138. Richard A. Posner, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 272–73 (1981); see also id. at 231 
(“[P]rivacy means the withholding of information, particularly personal information . . . .”). 
139. Posner, supra note 69, at 174–75. 
140. Gerety, supra note 69, at 282. 
141. Mary D. Fan, Constitutionalizing Informational Privacy by Assumption,  
14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 953, 979 (2012). 
142. Solove, supra note 68, at 1129–30, 1135. 
143. Skinner-Thompson, supra note 108, at 162, 205. 
144. Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 125 (2004). 
145. Id. 
146. Jeffrey Skopek, Reasonable Expectations of Anonymity, 101 VA. L. REV. 691, 700 (2015). 
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In yet another attempt to mark the boundaries of informational privacy, Seth 
Kreimer has posited that recognition of a privacy right should hinge on whether 
dissemination of information would intrude upon an explicit provision of the Bill 
of Rights.147 According to Kreimer, the right to privacy must be “rooted in the 
constitutional framework itself.”148 If disclosure of information would interfere 
with, for example, free exercise of religion or freedom of association, then such 
disclosure could be deemed unconstitutional.149 Disclosures of information that do 
not implicate an explicit provision of the Bill of Rights, in contrast,150 may not rise 
to the level of a constitutional violation. 
III. POLICE OFFICERS AND PRIVACY RIGHTS 
Having discussed the boundaries of informational privacy law in Part II, the 
question now becomes where police misconduct records fit within these categories 
of information the law deems private. Answering this question requires two distinct 
analyses. First, does the law recognize a privacy right in the kinds of information 
typically contained within police misconduct records? Second, if it does, how should 
that privacy right be balanced against the interests of other actors? Part III addresses 
both of these questions in turn.  
A. Assessing whether police misconduct records fit within the boundaries of privacy rights 
As discussed in Part II, the question of whether the Constitution protects a 
right to informational privacy is not entirely settled.151 However, given that most 
scholars and lower courts acknowledge a constitutional right to privacy of at least 
some information152—and the Supreme Court has repeatedly alluded to its 
existence, though never affirmed it explicitly153—the remainder of this article 
proceeds under the assumption that informational privacy is a cognizable right in 
certain contexts. The crux of the analysis becomes whether this right is 
appropriately applied to the specific context of police misconduct records.  
i. Subject matter of the records 
Police misconduct records contain information pertaining to both allegations 
and sustained findings of police misconduct.154 This information will frequently 
 
147. Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy and 
Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 132–34 (1991). 
148. Id. at 132. 
149. Id. at 132–34. 
150. Id. at 143–46. 
151. See supra Part II.C. I take no position on whether informational privacy should be 
recognized as a right inherent in the Constitution; the purpose of this article is not to persuade the 
reader of whether informational privacy is a constitutional right, but rather to apply privacy rights as 
they are historically and currently understood to the debate surrounding police misconduct records. 
152. Supra notes 132-40. 
153. Supra notes 100-113. 
154. See supra note 1. 
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include records of complaints against police officers (lodged by both civilians and 
fellow officers), internal affairs reports, disciplinary findings against officers, 
performance evaluations, and, in some jurisdictions, body camera footage or other 
technology recording instances of possible misconduct by officers.155  
Two examples may help illuminate the dramatically divergent approaches that 
different jurisdictions take to disclosure of misconduct records. The first is that of 
Mohamed Noor, a Minneapolis police officer convicted in 2019 of murder for 
shooting and killing Justine Damond, an Australian woman who had called the 
police moments earlier to report a possible assault happening outside her home.156 
Minnesota is one of the twelve states that treat most police misconduct reports as 
matters of public record.157 Investigators from Minnesota’s Bureau of Criminal 
Apprehension obtained information documenting that, approximately two months 
before he shot and killed Damond, Noor put a gun to the head of a motorist pulled 
over for a minor traffic stop.158 An initial police incident report written shortly after 
the incident indicated that Noor and his partner stopped the driver after seeing him 
give the middle finger to a bicyclist and pass a vehicle without signaling.159 In the 
incident report, neither Noor nor his partner documented Noor’s use of the gun or 
provided any justification for it.160 
Due in part to Minnesota’s open records laws, Noor’s past history of allegedly 
inappropriate gun use was available to the prosecutor and the public. The 
government, unsurprisingly, sought to use this information against Noor in his 
criminal case.161 Contrast Noor’s case with a cases in a state like New York, which 
protects police misconduct records from disclosure and where the prosecutor’s 
 
155. See Abel, supra note 1, at 745; Levine, supra note 1, at 859–60; Moran, supra note 3.  
156. Mitch Smith, Minneapolis Police Officer Convicted of Murder in Shooting of Australian 
Woman, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/30/us/minneapolis-police-
noor-verdict.html [https://perma.cc/NA8M-8Y8S]. 
157. See MINN. STAT. § 13.43(2) (2018). The following information is public: “ . . . (4) the 
existence and status of any complaints or charges against the employee, regardless of whether the 
complaint or charge resulted in a disciplinary action; (5) the final disposition of any disciplinary action 
together with the specific reasons for the action and data documenting the basis of the action, excluding 
data that would identify confidential sources who are employees of the public body.” Id. 
158. Libor Jany, Filing: Mohamed Noor Raised Red Flags Among Psychiatrists, Training Officers, 
STAR TRIB. (Sept. 6, 2018), http://www.startribune.com/judge-rejects-motion-to-seal-medical-
records-in-trial-for-officer-who-killed-justine-ruszczyk-damond/492518991/ [https://perma.cc/ 
C68A-CU6H]; see also State’s Response to Court’s Order to Submit Supplemental Materials for Review 
Regarding Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Probable Cause, State v. Noor, MNCIS No: 27-
CR-18-6859 (D. Minn. 2018), http://mncourts.gov/mncourtsgov/media/High-Profile-Cases/27-CR-
18-6859/Memo091918.pdf [https://perma.cc/LE9T-Y6VK]. 
159. Jany, supra note 158. 
160. Id. 
161. State’s Response to Defendant’s Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Probable Cause, State  
v. Noor, No: 27-CR-18-6859 (D. Minn. 2018), http://mncourts.gov/mncourtsgov/media/High-
Profile-Cases/27-CR-18-6859/ResponseToMotionToDismiss090518.pdf [https://perma.cc/4X24-
3C6W]. The State argued that the records should be sealed pursuant to an exception for criminal 
investigative data, MINN. STAT. § 13.82, subd. 7 (2017), but did not prevail on that point. Id. 
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office may not have immediate access to such records.162 After NYPD officer 
Daniel Pantaleo choked Eric Garner to death in 2014, a grand jury declined to indict 
Pantaleo for his role in Garner’s death.163 It is impossible to say what information 
the grand jury received, because the Staten Island District Attorney’s office has 
refused to release records of the proceedings.164 But the public did not learn until 
2017 that Pantaleo had incurred fourteen prior complaints of misconduct before 
killing Garner, including multiple allegations of excessive force and abusive 
behavior.165 (The information was disclosed only after an employee of the Civilian 
Complaint Review Board leaked it to the press; that employee was later fired for 
the leak.166) Pantaleo is far from the only NYPD officer with a lengthy history of 
misconduct to remain on the force. Internal affairs reports leaked to BuzzFeed News 
in 2018 indicate that officers have retained their positions after misconduct 
including perjury, assault, excessive force, and improper use of a gun.167 Absent 
unauthorized leaks, the public would have no knowledge of or access to this 
information. 
These examples illustrate not only the different approaches that states take to 
the privacy of police misconduct records but also how these varied approaches may 
contribute to disparate treatment of officers accused of misconduct. While 
Minnesota and New York represent two extremes, many other states fall 
somewhere in the middle, exempting disclosure when it would constitute an 
“unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” but providing no statutory guidance as 
to what an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy is.168 Given the troubling 
 
162. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50-a(1) (McKinney 2014); People v. Garrett, 18 N.E.3d 722, 732 
(N.Y. 2014); McKinley, Jr., supra note 63. 
163. Lauren Gambino, Eric Garner: Grand Jury Declines to Indict NYPD Officer Over Chokehold 
Death, GUARDIAN (Dec. 3, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2014/dec/03/eric-garner-
grand-jury-declines-indict-nypd-chokehold-death [https://perma.cc/SYH6-CV25]. 
164. J. David Goodman, Appeals Court Rules for Transcripts in Eric Garner Case to Remain 
Sealed, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/24/nyregion/appeals-court-
rules-for-transcripts-in-eric-garner-case-to-remain-sealed.html [https://perma.cc/KB8X-RC3F]. 
165. Officer History, SCRIBD, https://www.scribd.com/document/342591738/D-Pantaleo-
Alleged-CCRB-File#fullscreen&from_embed [https://perma.cc/4VA8-D4P5] ( last visited Sept. 10, 
2018); see also Carimah Townes & Jack Jenkins, EXCLUSIVE DOCUMENTS: The Disturbing Secret 
History of the NYPD Officer Who Killed Eric Garner, THINK PROGRESS (Mar. 21, 2017), https://
thinkprogress.org/daniel-pantaleo-records-75833e6168f3/ [https://perma.cc/79U5-5FY7]. 
166. Denis Slattery, Garner Chokehold Cop’s Sealed Disciplinary Records Shouldn’t Affect  
Broader Request  in  Separate  Case,  Lawyers  Argue,  N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 8, 2017), http://
www.nydailynews.com/new-york/pantaleo-decision-shouldn-affect-separate-nypd-suit-lawyers-
article-1.3033620 [https://perma.cc/JK44-QBMC]. 
167. Hayes, supra note 60; Taggart & Hayes, supra note 17. 
168. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-210(b)(2) (2013) (exempting personnel records from 
disclosure to the public if such disclosure would constitute an “invasion of personal privacy”);  
D.C. CODE § 2-534(a)(3) (2018) (exempting records of investigations conducted by the Office of Police 
Complaints, to the extent disclosure of such records would “[c]onstitute an unwarranted invasion of 
personal privacy”); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 15.243(1)(a), (b) (2018) (precluding disclosure of personal 
information or law enforcement investigative records that would “constitute a clearly unwarranted 
invasion of . . . privacy”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 91-A:5(IV) (2009) (exempting personnel records 
“and other files whose disclosure would constitute invasion of privacy”). 
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histories of police misconduct and growing controversy surrounding non-disclosure 
of records that Part I discussed, this Article now turns to existing privacy law and 
theory in an effort to unearth unifying principles that can guide states attempting to 
reform, or even interpret, their existing records disclosure policies. 
While the Supreme Court’s informational privacy jurisprudence leaves some 
clarity to be desired, it provides little to suggest that most police misconduct records 
would fall within the kinds of highly personal information the Court has recognized 
as private. Whalen and Nelson both involved claims to privacy in medical and mental 
health information, specifically drug use, drug treatment, and counseling.169 
Although the Court acknowledged that both cases arguably implicated 
constitutional privacy rights, it grounded this reasoning in the notion that such 
information was “personal.”170 Even the Reporters Committee Court, which reasoned 
that disclosure of criminal history records could constitute an unwarranted invasion 
of personal privacy, made clear that its concern was rooted in information 
“containing personal details about private citizens.”171 Lower court jurisprudence 
has similarly limited infringements of informational privacy to those involving 
intimate or personal information, generally defined by example as including details 
about medical, sexual, or financial history and activities.172  
Although scholars have endorsed slightly broader approaches to informational 
privacy rights, their analyses also would exclude the content of most police 
misconduct records. Police misconduct records do not generally fall within the 
categories of either intimate or political information, which are the two areas of 
informational privacy that Professor Skinner-Thompson suggests the Constitution 
should protect.173 Professor Kreimer’s examples of information that should be 
deemed private similarly include political viewpoints, voting activity, and that central 
to the formation of identity.174  
Other privacy scholars—Daniel Solove, Helen Nissenbaum, and Christopher 
Slobogin, to name a few—contend that informational privacy rights should 
generally be limited to records involving the same kinds of intimate and  
 
169. NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 138 (2011); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598–600 (1977). 
170. See Nelson, 562 U.S. at 138, 144, 155; Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605. 
171. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 766 (1989). 
172. See Lee v. City of Columbus, 636 F.3d 245, 248, 260 (6th Cir. 2011); Seaton v. Mayberg, 
610 F.3d 530, 536–40 (9th Cir. 2010); Lankford v. City of Hobart, 27 F.3d 477, 479 (10th Cir. 1994); 
Doe v. Wigginton, 21 F.3d 733, 740 (6th Cir. 1994); Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 189–90, 
192–94 (4th Cir. 1990); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 839–49 (1st Cir. 1987); Fraternal Order of 
Police, Lodge No. 5 v. City of Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105, 112–14 (3d Cir. 1987); Barry v. City of New 
York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1558–62 (2d Cir. 1983); J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1089–90 (6th Cir. 1981); 
United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577–80 (3d Cir. 1980); Plante v. Gonzalez, 
575 F.2d 1119, 1132–36 (5th Cir. 1978). 
173. See Skinner-Thompson, supra note 108, at 175–76 (“Informational privacy’s more nuanced 
constitutional value is in protecting two categories of information—intimate or political information—
and preventing that information from serving as the basis for discrimination or political 
marginalization.”). 
174. Kreimer, supra note 147, at 67–68. 
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personal information the courts have recognized, including medical or  
financial information.175 
Most police misconduct records do not fall within these categories of highly 
personal, intimate, or political information. Officer Noor’s decision to point a gun 
at a motorist’s head during a traffic stop has no apparent relationship to his medical, 
sexual, or financial history. Similarly, little can be deemed either intimate or political 
about Officer Pantaleo’s alleged use of excessive force on civilians prior to his 
deadly encounter with Eric Garner, nor of the other leaked records regarding 
NYPD officers who committed perjury or assault while on duty.176 Yet, because of 
the inconsistent privacy approaches in the two states, Minnesotans learned far more 
about Officer Noor’s conduct than New Yorkers about Officer Pantaleo.177 
Several courts faced with claims regarding disclosure of police misconduct 
records have concluded that the records were not private. In Denver Policemen’s 
Protective Association v. Liechtenstein, the Tenth Circuit rejected the notion that police 
personnel records necessarily fall within the zone of information that should be 
deemed private.178 Liechtenstein involved a Denver police union’s objection to court-
ordered disclosure of police officers’ personnel files to a criminal defendant who 
had been arrested for allegedly assaulting one of the officers.179 The court noted 
that information within personnel records regarding possible officer misconduct 
was comparable to criminal history records of ordinary civilians, which were 
routinely discoverable under Colorado law.180 The court found it “ironic” that the 
police union on one hand argued that officers’ right to privacy was the same as any 
civilians, while on the other hand asserting that personnel files should receive 
greater privacy protections than criminal history records.181 
A Missouri appellate court considered and rejected the notion that police 
officers have a constitutional right to privacy in the content of their disciplinary 
records, at least when the disciplinary records involve sustained findings of on-duty 
misconduct against the officers.182 After St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department 
officers were internally investigated and disciplined for confiscating World Series 
tickets from scalpers and using the tickets for their own benefit, John Chasnoff183 
 
175. Nissenbaum, supra note 144, at 128; Christopher Slobogin, Subpoenas and Privacy, 54 
DEPAUL L. REV. 805, 828 (2005) ;Solove, supra note 68, at 1129–30, 1135. 
176. See Officer History, supra note 165; Hayes, supra note 60; Taggert & Hayes, supra note 17; 
Townes & Jenkins, supra note 165. 
177. Compare MINN. STAT. § 13.43, subd. 2 (2015), with N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50-a 
(McKinney 2014). 
178. Denver Policemen’s Protective Ass’n v. Lichtenstein, 660 F.2d 432 (10th Cir. 1981). 
179. Id. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. at 436–37; see also Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 1557, 1570 (10th Cir. 1989) (finding 
police internal affairs files not protected by the right to privacy when the “documents related simply to 
the officers’ work as police officers”). 
182. Chasnoff v. Mokwa, 466 S.W.3d 571 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015). 
183. The appellate decision does not explain the relationship, if any, of John Chasnoff to this 
investigation. 
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sought access to the complaints and investigative reports regarding this incident.184 
The police department refused to produce the entire investigative file,185 and 
Chasnoff sued.186 The police officers asserted a “legally protected privacy interest 
in their personnel records” and testified that disclosure of the records would cause 
embarrassment and damage to their reputations.187 After reviewing the files, the 
Missouri Court of Appeals found no information “even arguably of a purely 
personal character in the disputed records. . . . Rather, this is simply a case of 
substantiated on-the-job misconduct, namely the misuse of evidence.”188 The court 
held that “police officers lack a protectable privacy interest in these records of their 
substantiated on-the-job police misconduct” and rejected the officers’ claim that a 
constitutional or common-law right to privacy would protect against disclosure of 
the records.189 
The Louisiana Court of Appeals also held that records of internal 
investigations into police misconduct and resulting discipline are not private.190 In 
the wake of Hurricane Katrina, a newspaper sought records regarding discipline 
imposed against, or investigations into alleged misconduct and excessive force by, 
Baton Rouge police officers.191 The police department and individual officers 
objected, arguing that disclosure of the records would violate the officers’ rights to 
privacy.192 At a hearing on the issue of whether the records should be released, the 
president of Louisiana’s Fraternal Order of Police testified that he believed release 
of the disciplinary or investigative records would “injure law enforcement officers, 
cause embarrassment, and hinder relations with other co-workers.”193 The court 
reasoned that the right to privacy encompasses, inter alia, “the individual’s right to 
be free from unreasonable intrusion into his seclusion, solitude, or private 
affairs.”194 Despite recognizing a right to privacy in the abstract, the court held that 
it did not find “any legitimate reasonable expectations of privacy” in the misconduct 
records, as the investigations concerned “public employees’ alleged improper 
activities in the workplace” rather than private behavior.195 The court did, however, 
order redaction of personal phone numbers, home addresses, medical records, 
 
184. Chasnoff, 466 S.W.3d at 574–75. 
185. The file consisted of “59 documents from the IAD investigation, namely interview 
transcripts and recordings of the interviews with each of the 19 police officers in the Ishmon case, the 
‘advice of rights’ form executed by 16 officers, seven officers’ consent-to-discipline forms, a 
computerized summary of the investigation results covering 16 officers, and IAD administrative 
reports.” Id. at 576. 
186. Id. at 574. 
187. Id. at 576–77. 
188. Id. at 579–80. 
189. Id. at 573, 580. 
190. City of Baton Rouge/Parish v. Capital City Press, LLC, 4 So. 3d 807 (La. Ct. App. 2008). 
191. Id. at 810–12. 
192. Id. at 812–16. 
193. Id. at 813. 
194. Id. at 819. 
195. Id. at 821. 
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social security numbers, and other personal information unrelated to  
the misconduct.196 
While the Missouri and Louisiana courts’ opinions dealt primarily with records 
of substantiated misconduct rather than mere allegations, the South Carolina Court 
of Appeals has rejected officers’ claims of a right to privacy in records of unproven 
allegations.197 The court held that, although South Carolina’s open records act 
exempts from disclosure information that would “constitute an unreasonable 
invasion of privacy,”198 that provision does not apply to records regarding 
allegations of on-duty misconduct by police officers or sheriff’s deputies.199 The 
court also concluded that law enforcement officers do not have a constitutional 
privacy interest in information regarding their on-duty conduct and declined to 
extend the right of privacy beyond “the most intimate decisions affecting personal 
autonomy—namely reproductive rights, familial and marital relations.”200 
The four cases discussed above all involved records of on-duty misconduct. 
One federal district court, in an unpublished decision, has held that police officers 
could not establish a privacy interest in the contents of internal affair records into 
their off-duty misconduct, where the records discussed use of racial slurs, 
intoxication, and embarrassing conduct at a bar, none of which rose to the level of 
a constitutionally protected privacy interest.201 The court did not, however, address 
the issue of off-duty conduct more broadly or whether such conduct bears greater 
resemblance to information falling within a protected privacy right.  
The fact that many police misconduct records do not contain the kinds of 
information that the law traditionally deems private is a factor weighing in favor of 
increasing public access to these records, and jurisdictions should take this into 
account when crafting or amending their own disclosure provisions. But that is not 
to say that no misconduct records can be deemed private. Consider, for example, 
the case of an officer struggling with alcohol or drug abuse. Although a history of 
substance abuse may be relevant to an officer’s ability to perform his or her job 
well, it also falls within the category of medical and mental health information, 
generally deemed private.202 And for good reason: a workplace policy that 
automatically grants public access to information detailing employee struggles with 
substance abuse may well have the detrimental effect of deterring that employee 




197. Burton v. York Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 358 S.C. 339, 352–53 (App. Ct. 2004). 
198. S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-40(a)(2) (2001). 
199. Burton, 358 S.C. at 352–53. 
200. Id. at 354. 
201. Olivera v. Vizzusi, No. CIV. 2:10-1747 WBS GGH, 2011 WL 1253887, at *1–6  
(E.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2011). 
202. Supra Part II.B.–C. 
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It is not hard to envision other situations where the boundaries of what 
constitutes intimate and private information are blurry. Imagine a police officer 
going home after work and getting into regular shouting matches with a spouse or 
intimate partner, leading the partner to eventually complain to the police 
department that the officer has a violent temperament and should not be allowed 
to bring his or her service weapon home. While evidence that the officer has 
difficulty controlling her temper may well be information the public has a legitimate 
interest in knowing, the context of the marital dispute is also much more akin to the 
kind of intimate and personal information that courts contemplate as within the 
scope of a right to privacy.203  
ii. Status of the actor: police officers as public actors 
While the content of police misconduct records is critical to the analysis of 
whether the records should be deemed private, it is not the end of the inquiry. The 
next step is examining whether the subject of the records is a public or private actor.  
As noted in the introduction to this article, there is an almost complete void 
in legal scholarship regarding the application of privacy theory to police officers.204 
But privacy theory has long demarcated private and public actors, reasoning that 
public actors cannot demand the same level of privacy as those who have not 
knowingly exposed their activities to the public.205 Warren and Brandeis drew a line 
in the sand between information regarding conduct by private persons and that 
regarding people holding positions of public trust. In The Right to Privacy, they 
argued that privacy rights “do[ ] not prohibit any publication of matter which is of 
public or general interest.”206 They went on to explain that, while some people could 
reasonably claim a right to privacy in actions they did not willingly expose to the 
public, others by virtue of their “public or quasi public position” have “renounced 
the right to live their lives screened from public observation.”207 The line they drew 
was unequivocal: matters involving the “private life, habits, acts, and relations of an 
individual” should be deemed private.208 In contrast, actions associated with the 
discharged of a public duty were not private.209 For Warren and Brandeis the 
question seemed to center around not simply whether the actor was acting in a 
 
203. Supra Part II.C. 
204. Kate Levine, who cautions against requiring public disclosure of police disciplinary 
records, has acknowledged that police officers likely do not have the same privacy rights as ordinary 
citizens. See Levine, supra note 1, at 856 (“Of course, the right to privacy for an individual private citizen 
is not the same thing as the right to privacy for elected government officials or, perhaps, even for 
individuals, like the police, who work for an elected government.”). Levine’s article does not, however, 
attempt to analyze the privacy rights of police officers or other public actors. 
205. See Larremore, supra note 73, at 698–702 (discussing the difference between “public and 
private characters,” and the law’s unwillingness to afford the same privacy protections to public actors). 
206. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 69, at 214. 
207. Id. at 215–16. 
208. Id. at 216–17. 
209. Id. 
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public capacity—e.g., on duty as a police officer—but whether by virtue of a public 
position his actions, on duty or not, were within the realm of the public’s interest.210 
More recent jurisprudence has continued to maintain this distinction between 
private and public actors. In Nixon v. Administrator of General Services the Supreme 
Court, rejecting President Nixon’s claim to privacy in certain presidential records, 
concluded that people who enter public life “voluntarily surrender[ ] the privacy 
secured by law for those who elect not to place themselves in the public 
spotlight.”211 The Court distinguishes between public and private actors in other 
arenas as well. One example is the First Amendment context, where the Supreme 
Court has held that public actors must prove actual malice in order to succeed on a 
claim of defamatory falsehood relating to official conduct,212 whereas private actors 
have a lesser burden because they have not “voluntarily exposed themselves” to 
public scrutiny and criticism.213 
The Supreme Court has yet to set forth a clear definition of what constitutes 
a “public official.”214 While police officers have presumably not assumed the 
burden of public scrutiny to the same extent as the President of the United States, 
at least two state supreme courts, Hawaii and Washington, have utilized this public/
private actor distinction in the context of police misconduct records.215 Both courts 
concluded that, due to police officers’ status as public employees, instances of on-
duty misconduct by a police officer are “not private, intimate, personal details of 
the officer’s life,” but rather “matters with which the public has a right to concern 
itself.”216  
State and federal statutes take a mixed approach to the privacy rights of public 
actors. Illinois’s Freedom of Information Act specifically exempts from disclosure 
“[p]rivate information,” as well as “[p]ersonal information contained within public 
records, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of 
personal privacy.”217 The statute goes on, however, to state that “disclosure of 
information that bears on the public duties of public employees and officials shall 
 
210. Id. at 216–17 (positing that actions of a public actor, even those in the discharge of a 
“private duty,” are not protected by the right to privacy). 
211.  Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 455 (1977) (quoting N.Y. Times  
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)). 
212. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80, 283. 
213. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345–46 (1974); Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269–71. 
214. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 119 n.8 (1979) (acknowledging that the Court 
has not established precise boundaries for the definition of public official); see also Jeffrey O. Usman, 
Defamation and the Government Employee: Redefining Who Constitutes a Public Official,  
47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 247, 255 (2015) (recognizing confusion among the lower courts as to the definition 
of public official and arguing for an expansive definition). 
215. Cowles Publ’g v. State Patrol, 748 P.2d 597, 605 (Wash. 1988); State Org. of Police 
Officers (SHOPO) v. Soc’y of Prof’l Journalists-Univ. of Haw. Chapter, 927 P.2d 386, 398–99 (1996). 
216. Cowles Publ’g, 748 P.2d at 605; SHOPO, 927 P.2d at 398–99. 
217. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/7 (2018). 
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not be considered an invasion of personal privacy.”218 In contrast, a number of 
states exempt the personnel records of all public officials or employees from their 
open records act.219 The Electronic Communications Privacy Act prevents federal 
government agencies from disclosing certain records about their employees, 
including but not limited to “education, financial transactions, medical history, and 
criminal or employment history,” if a name or other identifying characteristic is 
attached.220 The Act does contain a number of exceptions permitting disclosure in 
specific circumstances, including by court order or for law enforcement activities.221 
iii. Comparison to similar records of other actors 
The analysis of whether police officers have legally cognizable rights to privacy 
in their misconduct records would not be complete without considering what 
privacy is afforded to comparable records of other employees. Due in large part to 
the power of police unions and their collective bargaining agreements, police 
officers enjoy many procedural protections during misconduct investigations that 
other public employees do not.222 Common examples of these protections include 
the opportunity for a waiting period between a misconduct complaint and 
subsequent investigation, laws precluding outside review agencies from conducting 
the investigation (instead limiting the investigation to internal affairs units), and laws 
that mandate the destruction of police misconduct records after a period of years.223  
To the specific question of whether personnel records can be disclosed, 
however, most states do not distinguish between police officers and other public 
employees. Of the roughly thirty-eight states that exempt some or all misconduct 
records from public disclosure, nearly all apply that exemption generally to public 
 
218. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/7(c) (2018). Illinois also exempts from disclosure records 
possessed by law enforcement and created for “law enforcement purposes,” but only to the extent that 
disclosure would interfere with law enforcement proceedings, endanger the life or safety of a law 
enforcement officer, or other exceptions not related to privacy. See id. at (d); see also Fraternal Order of 
Police, Lodge No. 7 v. City of Chicago, 2016 IL App (1st) 143884, ¶¶ 1, 36, 40 (concluding that records 
regarding civilian complaints of police misconduct are not exempt from disclosure under the State 
FOIA law). 
219. IDAHO CODE § 106(1) (2018); IOWA CODE § 22.7(11) (2018); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-
27-1.5(7) (2019); see also infra notes 25-26. 
220. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(4), (b) (2016). 
221. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b). 
222. Fisk & Richardson, supra note 14, at 718 (2017) (police officers receive “significantly more 
procedural and substantive protections against discipline” than many other employees); Keenan & 
Walker, supra note 14, at 185 (noting that U.S. police officers, mostly through the work of their unions, 
have achieved “a special layer of employee due process protections when faced with investigations for 
official misconduct”); Kate Levine, Police Suspects, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1197 (2016) (discussing the 
special protections police officers receive when suspects in criminal cases); Rushin, supra note 40, at 
1194–98, 1208–09 (explaining that law enforcement officer bills of rights “provide police officers with 
due process protections during disciplinary investigations that are not given to other classes of public 
employees”); id. at 1208–09, 1222, 1229–31, 1236–37, and cites therein (detailing the various procedural 
protections police officers receive that most other civilians do not). 
223. See, e.g., Rushin, supra note 40, at 1194–98, 1209–11, and sources therein (discussing many 
of these protections); Keenan & Walker, supra note 14, at 185. 
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employees, rather than specifically to law enforcement officers.224 Only three 
states—California, Delaware, and New York—have confidentiality laws that 
specifically single out police personnel records for greater disclosure protections,225 
and even California now permits disclosure of certain police misconduct records.226 
It is important to note, however, that personnel records are often defined more 
broadly than misconduct records. While personnel records may contain personal 
and financial information that fits more neatly within traditional conceptions of 
privacy rights, misconduct records are a subset of records that specifically involve 
allegations or findings of inappropriate conduct.227 The states that exempt all 
personnel records from public disclosure generally do not distinguish between 
misconduct records and other categories of personnel records. 
Among states that do provide special protection for records involving law 
enforcement, the differences in what the public can learn about police officers 
versus other public employees is stark. One example is the termination of a New 
York State Department of Transportation employee.228 To explain the basis for 
termination, an aide to the governor publicly explained that the employee was fired 
for, among other concerns, “internet misuse, email misuse, department vehicle 
misuse, blackberry misuse, [and] conflict of interest.”229 Had that employee been a 
police officer with a history of excessive force complaints, in contrast, the public 
would have had no right to know, and the police department could not have 
revealed this information.230 
B. Balancing police officers’ privacy rights against other interests 
As discussed in Part III.A., privacy law and theory does not support a 
constitutional right to privacy in most police misconduct records. But some 
misconduct records likely do implicate the kinds intimate and personal issues 
generally deemed private, like the examples of officer substance abuse or domestic 
 
224. Lewis et al., supra note 2; see also, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 106(1) (2018) (exempting personnel 
records from public records law); KAN. STAT. ANN § 45-221(a)(4) (2018) (exempting personnel records 
from public disclosure); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-27-1.5(7) (prohibiting disclosure to the public of 
personnel records other than “salaries and routine directory information”); supra notes 2, 25-26, 28. 
225. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 832.7, .8 (2019); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9200(d) (2018);  
N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §50-a; Dillon, supra note 18. 
226. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 832.7, .8 (amended statute effective Jan. 1, 2019). 
227. For example, Minnesota’s definition of personnel records includes salary, wage, and 
compensation information, time spent on leave, authorizations for deduction or withholding of pay, 
and benefit information. MINN. STAT. § 181.960, subd. 4. The Americans with Disabilities Act requires 
employers to maintain medical examination data in separate files. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (2009); 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1630.14 (2019); see also U.S. EQUAL EMP. COMM’N, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL FOR THE 
AMERICAN WITH DISABILITIES ACT § 6.5 (1992) (stating that employers should not include medical 
information in personnel files). 
228. See Robert Lewis et al., supra note 2. 
229. Id. 
230. See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50-a (McKinney 2014); In re N.Y. Civil Liberties Union  
v. N.Y. City Police Dep’t., No. 133, slip op. 08423 (N.Y. Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.nycourts.gov/
ctapps/Decisions/2018/Dec18/133opn18-Decision.pdf [https://perma.cc/6QFH-PP3D]. 
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disputes used above. Where records do implicate a privacy right, the subsequent 
analysis of how to balance officers’ privacy rights against other relevant interests is 
crucial.  
When the law recognizes a right to privacy, that right is not absolute.231 Most 
courts recognizing a privacy right in information then go on to apply a balancing 
test, assessing whether the privacy right outweighs (or is outweighed by) a 
governmental or public interest.232 Other courts invoke a test more akin to strict 
scrutiny, asking whether the privacy right is overridden by a compelling 
governmental interest.233 Under either standard, the relevant question is what other 
interests may outweigh the police officers’ rights to privacy. Part III.B. raises five 
interests that should factor into this balancing test: (1) the governmental interest in 
ensuring accountability of employees in positions of trust; (2) the right of the public 
to protect itself from abusive officers; (3) the interest in protecting privacy rights of 
civilians; (4) the governmental interest in effective decision-making regarding public 
employees; and (5) in the context of litigation, the right of defendants to access 
exculpatory information. 
i. Interest in enhancing public trust in law enforcement 
Our nation’s police departments have a serious trust problem. Lawyers and 
scholars agree that trust between police departments and the communities they are 
created to serve is “essential” to the stability and safety of the community.234 
Mistrust of the police undermines the legitimacy of both law enforcement and the 
 
231. See In re Crawford, 194 F.3d 954, 959 (9th Cir. 1999). 
232. Id. at 959 (the right to informational privacy “is a conditional right which may be infringed 
upon a showing of proper governmental interest.”); Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5 v. City of 
Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105, 110 (3d Cir. 1987) (disclosure of private information “may be required if 
the government interest in disclosure outweighs the individual’s privacy interest.”); Barry v. City of New 
York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1559 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting that most court apply “some form of intermediate 
scrutiny or balancing approach” when analyzing informational privacy rights); United States  
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577–78 (3d Cir. 1980) (concluding that employees have a 
privacy interest in their medical records, but that such right is “not absolute,” and “even material which 
is subject to protection must be produced or disclosed upon a showing of proper governmental 
interest”). 
233. See, e.g., Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 192 (4th Cir. 1990) (“[I]f the information 
is protected by a person’s right to privacy, then the [entity seeking the information] has the burden to 
prove that a compelling governmental interest in disclosure outweighs the individual’s privacy 
interest.”); Denver Policemen’s Protective Ass’n v. Lichtenstein, 660 F.2d 432, 436 (10th Cir. 1981) 
(“Assuming that the police officers have a legitimate expectation of privacy [in personnel files], the 
right may be overridden by a compelling state interest.”); Martinelli v. Dist. Court of Denver, 612 P.2d 
1083, 1091 (Colo. 1980) (adopting a three-part test when party invokes right to informational  
privacy: “(1) does the party seeking to come within the protection of right to confidentiality have a 
legitimate expectation that the materials or information will not be disclosed? (2) is disclosure 
nonetheless required to serve a compelling state interest? (3) if so, will the necessary disclosure occur 
in that manner which is least intrusive with respect to the right to confidentiality?”). 
234. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING,  
FINAL REPORT 1 (2015), http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/69E2-44F4]. 
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rule of law more generally.235 There is a strong correlation between trusting the 
police and willingness to obey or assist the police, such that communities with high 
trust of police may even be safer because of that trust.236  
Such trust is deservedly absent in many neighborhoods and cities across the 
United States. Communities of color in particular often feel estranged from the 
police, in part because the police seem to have virtually unlimited authority without 
corresponding accountability.237 Gallup polls conducted biannually between 1985 
and 2017 show that, over the past thirty years, consistently less than one-half of 
people of color surveyed nationwide express confidence that the police will serve 
and protect them, and many believe that the police are willing to use excessive force 
on them.238 Unchecked misconduct alienates those the police should serve and 
creates a fertile breeding ground for officers to abuse their positions of trust.239 
A particularly vivid example of unchecked misconduct is the Chicago Police 
Department’s response to the murder of Laquan McDonald by officer Jason Van 
Dyke, referenced in Part I.240 After Van Dyke fired sixteen shots at McDonald, five 
fellow police officers at the scene of the shooting filed reports claiming that 
McDonald was aggressively moving toward the officers when Van Dyke shot 
him.241 Although squad car footage of the shooting contradicted these accounts, the 
City of Chicago refused to release the footage for more than a year after McDonald’s 
murder, until it was finally court-ordered to do so.242 One of the journalists at the 
center of the effort to obtain the video described the horror of the murder itself as 
“compounded by the institutional response to it—by the knowledge that the city 
 
235. Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107, 1119 (2000). 
236. See, e.g., Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107, 1119 (2000); Stoughton, 
supra note 40, at 2188–90; Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy 
in Shaping Public Support for Policing, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 513, 514 (2003). 
237. Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE  
L.J. 2054 (2017), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/essay/police-reform-and-the-dismantling-of-legal-
estrangement [https://perma.cc/489Z-UEJF]. 
238. Jens Manuel Krogstad, Latino Confidence in Local Police Lower Than Among Whites, PEW 
RES. CTR. (Aug. 28, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/08/28/latino-confidence-in-
local-police-lower-than-among-whites [https://perma.cc/PPN4-26R6]; Justin McCarthy, Nonwhites 
Less Likely to Feel Police and Serve Them, GALLUP (Nov. 17, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/
179468/nonwhites-less-likely-feel-police-protect-serve.aspx [https://perma.cc/AP9R-P3BL]; Jim 
Norman, Confidence in Police Back at Historical Average, GALLUP ( July 10, 2017), https://
news.gallup.com/poll/213869/confidence-police-back-historical-average.aspx [https://perma.cc/ 
EZ9Z-9L3H]. 
239. Moran, supra note 47, at 843. 
240. See Guarino & Berman, supra note 48. 
241. Monica Davey, Officers’ Statements Differ from Video in Death of Laquan McDonald,  




242. See Jason Meisner & Jeremy Gorner, Chicago Forgoes Appeal After Judge Orders Release of 
Video of Fatal Police Shooting, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 20, 2015), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/
local/breaking/ct-judge-orders-release-of-video-showing-fatal-shooting-by-police-officer-20151119-
story.html [https://perma.cc/A9YM-6HLU]. 
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knew what happened and withheld that information from the public for over a year, 
while maintaining a patently false official account of the shooting.”243  
Passively permitting and hiding wrongdoing is all too common in many police 
departments around the country,244 and laws preventing disclosure of police 
misconduct records “affect[ ] significantly the degree to which the political process 
can be used to hold the police accountable for their actions.”245 When access to 
records regarding police misconduct is limited to internal affairs units—which in 
many police departments are staffed by the friends and coworkers of the accused 
officers246—departments have no external incentive to ensure that officers who 
engage in misconduct are held accountable.247 Conversely, when the public cannot 
access either records of allegations against officers or investigations into and 
assessments of those allegations, it cannot fairly judge whether its accountability 
system is working.248  
Preventing corruption and ensuring accountability of public servants like 
police officers are generally recognized as “strong public interest[s].”249 Although 
the Supreme Court has never opined specifically on the issue of whether disclosure 
of police misconduct records promotes the public interests in preventing corruption 
and ensuring accountability, it has endorsed transparency in other contexts. The 
constitutional right to a public trial, for example, is grounded in the ideal that public 
access to trials ensures transparency, promotes trustworthiness of judicial 
proceedings, and discourages witness perjury.250 As the Court observed in Richmond 
Newspapers, “People in an open society do not demand infallibility from their 
institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited from 
observing.”251 Erik Luna has argued that the same demands should be made of law 
enforcement and that citizens cannot be expected to trust police without 
“systematic visibility of policing decisions and concomitant justifications . . . . The 
 
243. Jamie Kalven, Chicago Faces a Defining Moment in Police Reform and Civil Order, 
INTERCEPT (Aug. 15, 2018), https://theintercept.com/2018/08/15/chicago-police-reform-rahm-
emanuel-laquan-mcdonald/ [https://perma.cc/3FQC-CE8B]. 
244. Rachel Moran, In Police We Trust, 62 VILL. L. REV. 953, 979–90 (2017); Moran, supra note 
47, at 853–68; see also Ciara Cummings, Bodycam Footage Shows Possible Police Cover Up in Orangeburg, 
WRDW (Sept. 5, 2018), http://www.wrdw.com/content/news/Local-attorney-to-address-
prosecution-of-man-in-Orangeburg-492493261.html [https://perma.cc/G3ZU-BUVB] (after falsely 
charging black man with assault and battery of an officer, police officers in Orangeburg, South Carolina 
colluded on a story and failed to disclose body camera footage proving that the man did not assault the 
officers, resulting in a 127-day jail stay for the man). 
245. Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 808 (2012). 
246. Moran, supra note 47, at 859–61. 
247. Stephen Rushin, Using Data to Reduce Police Violence, 57 B.C. L. REV. 117, 135 (2016). 
248. Conti-Cook, supra note 39. 
249. See Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5 v. City of Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105, 116–17 
(3d Cir. 1987); see also NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 150–53 (2011) (recognizing the government’s 
“strong interest” in employing a competent workforce). 
250. See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984); Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448  
U.S. 555, 569 (1980). 
251. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 572. 
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electorate should be able to observe and scrutinize the substantive and procedural 
policy choices of criminal law enforcement.”252 Monica Bell also suggests that 
transparency measures in law enforcement can “contribute to the overall 
democratization of policing in a way that could begin to root out legal 
estrangement.”253 
In the context of police misconduct records, an unusual alliance of journalists, 
activists, lawmakers, and even police chiefs and police department lawyers is 
beginning to coalesce around the idea that increased transparency is important in 
improving public trust.254 When a Hawaii newspaper sought records regarding 
Honolulu police officers who had been disciplined for on-duty misconduct, it 
argued that providing public access to the disciplinary records “minimizes the 
possibility of abuse by ensuring that police departments and officers are held 
accountable for their actions.”255 In California, the LA Times reported that 
approximately 92–98 percent of civilian complaints regarding police misconduct are 
rejected by internal affairs units across the state without any public explanation, and 
thus civilians “have no ability to evaluate the fairness of the process.”256 Both 
arguments met with some recognition from the various branches of government: in 
Hawaii the Supreme Court ruled that misconduct records could be disclosed if the 
trial court found that the public interest in accessing the records outweighed the 
officers’ privacy rights;257 and in California the legislature finally passed and the 
governor signed in late 2018, a bill authorizing disclosure of certain misconduct 
records.258  
 
252. Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107, 1120 (2000); see also id. at 1131 
(“[A]ccessibility, responsiveness, and accountability require some minimal amount of openness in state 
information. It is difficult to argue that government officials are accessible to the citizenry in any 
meaningful sense if they deny public access to the materials upon which their decisions are made.”). 
253. Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE 
L.J. 2054 (2017), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/essay/police-reform-and-the-dismantling-of-legal-
estrangement [https://perma.cc/4JEG-AVNQ]. 
254. See 2018 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 988 (S.B. 1421) (effective Jan. 1, 2019); Conti-Cook, supra 
note 39; Sullivan et al., supra note 39; NEW YORK CITY BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT ON  
LEGISLATION BY THE CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE CRIMINAL COURTS COMMITTEE 1 (May 2018), 
http://s3.amazonaws.com/documents.nycbar.org/files/2017285-50aPoliceRecordsTransparency.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8NJC-9SY9]; Neill Franklin, The Video Doesn’t Lie—Even If the Officer Did, 
TMP (Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/10/16/the-video-doesn-t-lie-even-
if-the-officer-did?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=newsletter&utm_source=opening-
statement&utm_term=newsletter-20181017-1166 [https://perma.cc/2KFB-5JVB] (Executive 
Director of the Law Enforcement Action Partnership calling for increased transparency of information 
pertaining to police misconduct). 
255. Peer News LLC v. City of Honolulu, 138 Haw. 53, 74 (2016) (explaining why public 
interest in production of records may outweigh police privacy interest); see also Cowles Publ’g v. State 
Patrol, 748 P.2d 597, 605 (Wash. 1988) (Officers’ privacy considerations are “overwhelmed by public 
accountability” interests.). 
256. See Queally, supra note 35.  
257. Peer News LLC, 138 Haw. at 73–74.  
258. S.B. 1421, 2017-2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). 
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Some police chiefs also support increased transparency of misconduct 
records, arguing that disclosing the names of officers accused of misconduct builds 
community trust.259 In New York, which has the strictest non-disclosure law in the 
country,260 the New York City Bar Association issued a report in 2018 concluding 
that the non-disclosure law improperly stymies public awareness of police 
misconduct and raises concern that officers are insufficiently accountable to the 
public.261 Even NYPD lawyers have acknowledged that the law “does not 
adequately address the public interest in transparency and accountability for those 
in positions of public trust.”262 
ii. Interest in physical protection from abusive officers 
A related but distinct public interest is at play in the idea that disclosing 
misconduct records may make some communities physically safer by exposing 
abusive officers. The history of policing in the United States is replete with 
routinized practices of officers using unauthorized or illegal force in order to 
investigate crime, increase arrest numbers, and subjugate certain populations, 
generally people of color.263 While police violence has received significant attention 
in recent years, lack of access to information regarding how frequently these 
incidents occur and how the police department responds has made it easier for 
departments to paint these incidents as isolated and unavoidable, rather than 
troubling patterns deserving attention and reform.264 
 
259. Sullivan et al., supra note 39 (citing several police chiefs who opposed police unions’ efforts 
to prevent disclosure of the names of officers involved in shootings of civilians). 
260. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50a (McKinney 2014). 
261. NEW YORK CITY BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 254. 
262. Kendall Taggart & Mike Hayes, The NYPD Is Arguing, Once Again, That Punishments for 
Police Misconduct  Remain Secret, BUZZFEED NEWS (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.buzzfeed.com/
kendalltaggart/nypd-officer-discipline-secrecy-misconduct-court?utm_term=.wwZyDVvkW#.bm 
AXZq01V [https://perma.cc/3TUV-NQVC]. 
263. Luna, supra note 252, at 1145; Stephen Stirling & S.P. Sullivan, Hundreds of N.J. Cops Are 
Using Force at Alarming Rates. The State’s Not Tracking Them. So We Did., N.J.COM (Nov. 29, 2018), 
https://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2018/11/nj_police_use_of_force_punch_kick_pepper 
_spray_sho.html [https://perma.cc/8PKU-7A8E] (concluding that black people in New Jersey are 
three times more likely to experience a police officer using force on them than white 
people); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 5, 28 
(2015), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/
ferguson_police_department_report.pdf  [https://perma.cc/Y3X5-RSFP]  (documenting 
disproportionate use of force by police against African Americans); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
INVESTIGATION OF THE  DIVISION OF POLICE 12–24 (2014), http://www.justice.gov/sites/
default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2014/12/04/cleveland_division_of_police_findings_ 
letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z4KZ-93RL] (detailing patterns of excessive force by  
Cleveland police officers); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE NEW ORLEANS POLICE 
DEPARTMENT 3-9 (2011), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2011/03/17/
nopd_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/6QZB-6P5K] (discussing “use of unreasonable force” by New 
Orleans police officers). 
264. Rushin, supra note 247, at 135. 
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In Chicago, where police misconduct records were routinely withheld from 
the public until a 2014 court order ordering their release,265 results from the released 
complaints revealed “patterns of abuse” that many argued could have been detected 
earlier had the complaints been publicly available.266 A recent empirical study 
tracking a full decade of civilian complaints regarding misconduct by Chicago police 
officers found a statistically significant correlation between police officers who 
received numerous complaints, and the likelihood of those same officers being 
involved in “serious misconduct as measured by civil rights litigation.”267 The study 
also found that Officer Van Dyke, who murdered Laquan MacDonald in 2014,268 
fell among the worst thre percent of officers in terms of complaints received before 
the murder.269 
Making police misconduct records publicly available could empower civilians, 
journalists, and advocacy groups to identify both problematic police officers (who 
have, for example, received multiple or serious complaints regarding excessive 
force) and patterns of violence in certain police departments.270 In turn, this could 
motivate an accounting of law enforcement officials for retaining abusive officers 
and failing to reform departments that routinely engage in unauthorized force.271 
iii. Interest in protecting privacy rights of civilians 
It may seem counterintuitive to consider the privacy rights of civilians as a 
factor weighing against the privacy rights of police officers. But unchecked police 
powers result in significant intrusions on the privacy of ordinary civilians. Policing 
is, in the words of former police officer-turned-professor Seth Stoughton, 
“uniquely invasive.”272 Officers have tremendous discretionary authority regarding 
 
265. Kalven v. City of Chicago, 7 N.E.3d 741 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014). 
266. Jeremy Gorner & Annie Sweeney, Cops in SOS Unit Amassed Citizen Complaints,  
CHI. TRIB. ( July 30, 2014), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/chi-4-chicago-
cops-at-center-of-scandal-had-amassed-more-than-200-complaints-20140730-story.html [https:// 
perma.cc/45EU-64N3]. 
267. Rozema & Schanzenbach, Good Cop, Bad Cop: Using Civilian Allegations to Predict Police 
Misconduct, 11 AM. ECON. J 225, 227 (2019); see also Mari Cohen, Study: Van Dyke’s Complaint History 
Could Have Foretold Shooting of McDonald, INJUSTICE WATCH (Sept. 5, 2018), https://
www.injusticewatch.org/news/2018/study-van-dykes-complaint-history-could-have-foretold-
shooting-of-mcdonald/ [https://perma.cc/YGW3-6Z53]. 
268. Guarino & Berman, supra note 48. 
269. Rozema & Schanzenbach, supra note 267, at 258. 
270. Rushin, supra note 247, at 120–21; id. at 132; see also Michael Sisitzky & Simon McCormack, 
This Law Makes It Nearly Impossible to Police the NYPD, ACLU (Apr. 8, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/
blog/criminal-law-reform/reforming-police-practices/law-makes-it-nearly-impossible-police-nypd 
[https://perma.cc/967V-X42S] (“keeping [misconduct records] hidden makes it easier for the NYPD 
to avoid holding its officers accountable, which can put New Yorkers’ lives in danger.”). 
271. Rushin, supra, note 247, at 120–21; Sisitzky & McCormack, supra note 270.  
272. Seth Stoughton, Incidental Regulation of Policing, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2179, 2187 (2014). 
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who to surveil, stop, frisk, search, arrest, and even kill.273 Put another way, they have 
discretion over whose privacy to invade. 
As with other abuses, police-initiated invasions of privacy tend to fall 
disproportionately on marginalized populations. Mary Ann Franks has noted that 
police surveillance of marginalized people “has a long and troubling history. Race, 
class, and gender have all helped determine who is watched in society, and the right 
to privacy has been unequally distributed according to the same factors.”274 Young 
black men and women are especially likely to have their privacy invaded in the form 
of illegal stops, frisks, and searches, and the country has generally tolerated or even 
sanctioned these privacy invasions in the name of preserving order.275  
With great power should come great responsibility,276 and perhaps similarly 
great transparency. Where patrol officers’ daily decisions regarding whose privacy 
to invade can create such significant social cost, courts and legislators need to 
consider these costs in determining whether to protect the privacy of police 
misconduct records.277 
iv. Interest in effective decision-making 
Effective social policy and decision-making is predicated on access to 
information.278 Government officials faced with decisions about whether to retain 
a police chief, spend money on improving police training, or create a civilian review 
board to investigate complaints of officer misconduct—to name just a few tasks 
 
273. JOHN KLEINIG, ETHICS OF POLICING 204 (1996); Harmon, supra note 245, at 762; Rushin, 
supra note 40, at 1247–48; Stoughton, supra note 272, at 2187. 
274. Franks, supra note 68, at 441; see also Scott Skinner-Thompson, Privacy’s Double Standards, 
93 WASH. L. REV. 2051, 2055 (2018) (“Marginalized communities are disproportionately surveilled and 
subject to privacy violations.”). 
275. E.g., Franks, supra note 68, at 428–30, 443; NEW YORK CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, STOP 
AND FRISK DURING THE BLOOMBERG ADMINISTRATION 2002–2013, at 1 (Aug. 2014), https://
www.nyclu.org/sites/default/files/publications/stopandfrisk_briefer_2002-2013_final.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/68J2-F37P] (detailing the disproportionately high percentages of people of color who were 
stopped and frisked by police); Tanvi Mishra, Where Chicagoans Are Being Stopped and Frisked, CITY 
LAB ( June 8, 2018), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/06/where-chicagoans-are-being-stopped-
and-frisked/562160 [https://perma.cc/PE8H-TYV9] (data confirming that “Chicagoans of color are 
disproportionately affected” by stop and frisk practices). 
276. The precise origins of this familiar quote are difficult to track, but the general sentiment 
dates back to at least the New Testament Scriptures. See Luke 12:48 (New International Version) 
(“From everyone who has been given much, much will be demanded; and from the one who has been 
entrusted with much, much more will be asked.”). A statement made at the French National Convention 
of 1793 is also sometimes attributed as the source of this quote; the English translation is “They must 
consider that great responsibility follows inseparably from great power.” Collection Générale des 
Décrets Rendus par la Convention Nationale 72 (Chez Baudouin, Imprimeur de la 
Convention Nationale. A, Paris, 1793), https://books.google.com/books?id=D55aAAAAcAAJ&q 
=ins%C3%A9parable#v=snippet&q=ins%C3%A9parable&f=false [https://perma.cc/9FMC-N29J].  
277. Rushin, supra note 40, at 1247–48; see also Lewis et al., supra note 2 (quoting the executive 
director of New York State’s Committee on Open Government bemoaning that police officers “are 
the public employees who have the most power and control over people’s lives,” and yet the least public 
accountability due to laws protecting misconduct records from public access). 
278. Kreimer, supra note 147, at 73. 
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city officials commonly confront—need information regarding how the police 
department is addressing allegations of officer misconduct. 
Prosecutors also must have access to information about misconduct of 
officers they rely on for charges and convictions in criminal cases. Although 
California recently amended its law to permit access to certain misconduct 
records,279 the California Supreme Court is still weighing whether to permit 
prosecutors access to misconduct records even of officers who the prosecutors are 
utilizing as witnesses.280 In New York City, the NYPD routinely fails to notify the 
District Attorney’s office of police officers who have disciplinary issues that could 
impact their credibility as witnesses.281  
Without this information, prosecutors are hampered in assessing whether the 
officer is a credible witness and whether a potential case should be charged or move 
forward to trial. 282 In May of 2018 the general counsel for the Manhattan District 
Attorney’s Office drafted a letter addressing this very issue, complaining that the 
office’s lack of access to police misconduct records “frustrate[s] our ability, not only 
to prepare for trial, but to make early assessments of witness credibility, explore 
weaknesses in a potential case, and exonerate individuals who may have been 
mistakenly accused.”283  
v. Interests specific to the context of litigation 
The Tenth Circuit recognized in Denver Policemen’s Protective Association  
v. Lichtenstein that the rights to “ascertainment of the truth” and a complete 
presentation of relevant evidence in litigation can override police officers’ rights to 
privacy in their personnel records.284 This is particularly true in the context of 
criminal prosecutions, where the government has easy access to information about 
defendants’ alleged misconduct, but defendants routinely are denied reciprocal 
access to information about officer misconduct.285 Criminal defendants have a 
constitutional right to obtain exculpatory evidence in the government’s 
 
279. S.B. 1421, 2017-2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). 
280. See Ass’n for L.A. Deputy Sheriffs v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. App. 5th 413, 436–39,  
cert. granted, 403 P.3d 144 (Cal. 2017). 
281. See Mike Hayes & Kendall Taggart, The District Attorney Says the NYPD Isn’t Telling 





284. Denver Policemen’s Protective Ass’n v. Lichtenstein, 660 F.2d 432, 436 (10th Cir. 1981); 
see also Luna, supra note 252, at 1123 (“Rights are particularly important in criminal justice, where the 
full power of the state is marshaled against the individual suspect or defendant.”). 
285. Moran, supra note 3, at 1340–77; see also Levine, supra note 1, at 901 (making case for 
disclosure of police disciplinary records in specific context of criminal litigation); Slobogin, supra note 
175, at 806–07, 815–25, 839–40 (2005) (discussing the ample means the government has to subpoena 
information about private citizens). 
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possession.286 While that includes the right to access evidence that could impeach 
the credibility of the witnesses against a defendant,287 in practice many states get 
around this constitutional requirement by imposing significant procedural barriers 
on defendants’ ability to obtain police misconduct records.288 
Notably, New York’s and California’s statutes preventing public access to 
police misconduct records were both designed specifically with the goal of 
preventing defense counsel from using a police officer’s disciplinary records as 
impeachment in criminal cases.289 These statutes have almost certainly contributed 
to wrongful convictions of defendants who were unable to adequately contest the 
credibility of the officers testifying against them. An investigation by the New York 
Times found that on at least twenty-five occasions between 2015 and early 2018 
alone, judges or prosecutors determined that a key aspect of an NYPD officer’s 
testimony was probably untrue.290 In many cases the motive for lying was either to 
skirt constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures, or to 
concoct evidence that would support an otherwise unlikely conviction.291 These 
cases likely represent only a small fraction of instances in which officers lied to 
obtain a conviction.292  
IV. PRACTICAL CONCERNS REGARDING DISCLOSURE OF POLICE MISCONDUCT 
RECORDS 
While there are many reasons to permit public access to police misconduct 
records, it is important to recognize the possible practical consequences of 
disclosure. Part IV acknowledges four speculative harms related to disclosure of 
police misconduct records: (1) making records publicly accessible may deter police 
departments from accurately recording misconduct; (2) unreliable records could 
unfairly damage the reputations of police officers who have not actually engaged in 
misconduct; (3) permitting public access to records could incentivize retaliation 
against officers; and (4) officers who are concerned about incurring complaints may 
be reluctant to police proactively. 
As to the first concern, that making records publicly accessible may deter 
departments from reporting and recording misconduct, Kate Levine has accurately 
 
286. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
287. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). 
288. See Moran, supra note 3, at 1368–77. 
289. See In re Daily Gazette Co. v. City of Schenectady, 710 N.E.2d 1072, 1075 (N.Y. 1999) 
(“The statute was designed to prevent abusive exploitation of personally damaging information 
contained in officers’ personnel records—perhaps most often in connection with a criminal defense 
attorney’s . . . cross-examination of a police witness in a criminal prosecution.”); Dillon, supra note 18 
(describing origins of California’s law restricting access to misconduct records). 
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noted that police officers are already notorious for their solidarity and reluctance to 
snitch on each other.293 Levine, expressing concern over the prospect of making 
police disciplinary records accessible to the public, writes, “Because of this 
solidarity, it is not hard to imagine antiaccountability consequences arising from 
forced transparency.”294  
This is a legitimate concern, and perhaps no longer even speculative. As I have 
written in the past, police departments do indeed have a storied history of protecting 
and defending their own, often at the expense of fairly investigating or validating 
justified complaints of misconduct.295 Just recently, some California police 
departments, immediately prior to the enactment of California’s new bill permitting 
disclosure of some police misconduct records, began destroying the records 
altogether.296 But kowtowing to the bullying of police departments is not a solution. 
Increasing public access to misconduct records may actually represent a step in the 
direction toward solving police departments’ unwillingness to discipline their own. 
If the public can review these records and identify patterns of police departments 
rejecting civilian complaints and absolving their officers—or particular officers—
of responsibility for misconduct, it can begin to demand accountability from police 
department leadership. Without access to such data, the public cannot detect 
patterns in whether and how the department responds to misconduct allegations, 
and thus police departments may continue unabated to prioritize defending their 
officers over responding to civilian complaints. 
A related fear is that public access laws could incentivize police departments 
not to record misconduct data at all, so that the public has no information to review. 
This too can be prevented. Some jurisdictions permit civilians to file complaints 
about police officers with an outside review board rather than the police department 
itself, so that the police department is not the only entity entrusted with review of 
the misconduct allegation.297 Advances in technology such as body-worn cameras 
also help ensure that possible misconduct is recorded.298 
 
293. Levine, supra note 1, at 876. 
294. Id. 
295. Moran, supra note 47, at 853–68; Moran, supra note 244, at 972–86. 
296. Liam Dillon & Maya Lau, California Police Unions Are Preparing to Battle New Transparency 
Law in the Courtroom, L.A. TIMES ( Jan. 9, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-police-
records-law-challenges-20190109-story.html [https://perma.cc/ZPQ9-P8S3] (The police departments 
denied that their records purges were a response to the new law.). 
297. E.g., Online Complaint Form, CHICAGO CIVILIAN OFFICE OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY, 
https://www.chicagocopa.org/complaints/intake-form/ [https://perma.cc/6U4X-PCGJ] ( last 
accessed Sept. 10, 2019) (example of a complaint intake process that does not require filing with the 
police department); see also Moran, supra note 47, at 893–94 (describing methods by which complaints 
can be handled by agencies other than the police department). 
298. E.g., Study: Police Body-Worn Cameras Reduce Reports of Misconduct, Use of Force, UNLV 
NEWS CENTER (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.unlv.edu/news/release/study-police-body-worn-
cameras-reduce-reports-misconduct-use-force [https://perma.cc/AKD8-L6P6]; Amanda Ripley,  
A Big Test of Police Body Cameras Defies Expectations, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/10/20/upshot/a-big-test-of-police-body-cameras-defies-expectations.html 
[https://perma.cc/LGZ7-CZ6F] (most large police departments now use body worn cameras). 
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A second, related worry is that inaccurate records could cause unfair damage 
to the reputations and careers of police officers who have done nothing wrong.299 
This concern is especially acute for officers of color and female officers. Police 
department leadership, who are most likely to be involved in disciplinary decisions, 
are still predominantly white and male300 and anecdotal evidence suggests that 
officers of color and female officers are more likely to be exposed to unfair and 
discriminatory discipline than their white male counterparts.301  
Officers who defy the norm in ways other than race or gender may also 
experience inequitable discipline. A police officer in Weirton, West Virginia, was 
fired for not shooting a man who was holding a gun during a domestic disturbance; 
while the officer explained that he believed the man was suicidal but not homicidal 
and thus de-escalation tactics were more appropriate than shooting, the police 
department terminated him a few weeks later for “failing to eliminate a threat.”302 
While this is a dramatic example, it does not stand alone. Police departments in 
Buffalo, New York, and Newark, New Jersey, have disciplined officers for 
attempting to deescalate situations rather than using the force to which so many 
officers quickly resort.303 
L. Song Richardson and Catherine Fisk have acknowledged this problem, 
noting that for some officers, the unreliability of police records is a reason to 
oppose public access to these records.304 While inaccurate disciplinary records are a 
real concern, shielding them from public eye is a myopic solution. Many of the states 
that permit limited public access to misconduct records do so only in the context 
of disciplinary records—that is, situations where police officers have actually been 
disciplined for alleged misconduct.305 This Article, in contrast, focuses on the more 
 
299. Fisk & Richardson, supra note 14, at 752 (acknowledging some officers believe that “public 
accessibility of the records will only compound the harm of the unfair discipline by stigmatizing an 
officer and might facilitate reprisals if the officer’s name and home address are released”). 
300. Police Officers, DATAUSA, https://datausa.io/profile/soc/333050/#demographics 
[https://perma.cc/4FUF-VSDE] (collecting data showing that as of 2016 police officers in the United 
States were nearly 87% male and 79% white); see also GOVERNING, DIVERSITY ON THE FORCE: WHERE 
POLICE DON’T MIRROR COMMUNITIES (Sept. 2015), http://media.navigatored.com/documents/
policediversityreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/3KGP-U9BP] (detailing underrepresentation of people of 
color on police forces nationwide). 
301. See George Joseph, An Inside Look at an Ohio Police Force’s Race Problem, APPEAL  
(Aug. 13,  2018),  https://theappeal.org/columbus-ohio-police-department-racism-retaliation-
discrimination/ [https://perma.cc/BUF8-QRZQ] (detailing claims of discriminatory discipline against 
black officers in Columbus, Ohio police department); see also JAMES FORMAN, LOCKING UP OUR OWN 
ch. 3 (detailing the struggles of black police officers attempting to integrate mostly white forces).  
302. See Taylor Elizabeth Eldridge, When Trying to Help Gets You Fired, TMP (Sept. 17, 2018), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/09/17/when-trying-to-help-gets-you-fired?utm_medium 
=email&utm_campaign=newsletter&utm_source=opening-statement&utm_term=newsletter-20180 
918-1143 [https://perma.cc/HM9Q-92RQ] (Another officer on the scene did “eliminate the threat” 
by shooting and killing the man with the gun.). 
303. Id. 
304. Fisk & Richardson, supra note 14, at 752. 
305. See IOWA CODE § 22.7(11)(a)(5) (2018) (permitting disclosure of disciplinary records 
resulting in discharge or demotion); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-98(a)-(b) (2018) (protecting personnel 
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broadly defined misconduct records, which include all records pertaining to alleged 
misconduct regardless of whether it resulted in discipline. Making all misconduct 
records publicly available could help combat discrimination by allowing the public 
to see which populations of officers are incurring complaints, versus those actually 
being disciplined.306 In that way patterns of discrimination would be easier to detect 
than when limiting review to instances in which discipline was imposed. 
A third concern, voiced primarily by police unions, is that permitting public 
access to police misconduct records may incentivize retaliation against officers. 
When the California legislature was considering amending its draconian law 
enforcement records statute, the head of a major police union in the state labeled 
the proposed amendment “one of the most insidious and dangerous bills we’ve seen 
come along in many years and maybe decades in Sacramento.”307 In 2016, the 
Virginia legislature considered a bill that would have prevented police departments 
or government agencies from disclosing any names of police officers, including 
those accused of misconduct.308 The president of Virginia’s Fraternal Order of 
Police claimed that the bill was necessary “to keep our officers safe,” arguing that 
“law enforcement officers have been attacked and even assassinated” because of 
anti-law enforcement sentiments and that disclosing even the names of police 
officers “puts them at risk.”309 
The notion that disclosure of police records encourages or enables retaliation 
by the public against officers is, as criminology professor John Worrall has noted, 
based on a “total lack of data.”310 No credible evidence exists to indicate that 
 
files and disciplinary records from disclosure, but permitting disclosure of limited information 
pertaining to dismissal, suspensions, or demotions); OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 24A.7 (2014) (making 
personnel and disciplinary records confidential except to the extent they pertain to “final disciplinary 
action resulting in loss of pay, suspension, demotion of position, or termination”);  
65 PA. CONS. STAT. § 67.708(b)(7) (2009) (exempting information pertaining to criticism, demotion, 
discipline, or discharge, except for the “final action of an agency that results in demotion or discharge”); 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 1923(d), 2409 (2018) (limiting public access to certain situations in which 
officers were discipline).  
306. Cf. Conti-Cook, supra note 1, at 166 (arguing that, when police departments hide the results 
of misconduct investigations, “it prevents officers who have been treated unfairly from analyzing 
whether their penalty was disproportionately harsh. Investigations into racially biased or 
disproportionately punitive treatment could utilize data of reasonable or average penalties for similar 
misconduct”). 
307. Dillon, supra note 18. 
308. Tom Jackman, Secret Police? Virginia Considers Bill to Withhold All Officers’ Names, 
WASH. POST (Feb. 24, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/true-crime/wp/2016/02/24/ 
secret-police-virginia-considers-bill-to-withhold-all-officers-names/?noredirect=on [https://
perma.cc/K78B-PDYE]. 
309. Id.; see also Jason Tidd, Should Wichita Police Name Cops Who Shoot People? Citing Death 
Threats, Board Says No, WICHITA EAGLE (May 29, 2019), https://www-1.kansas.com/news/local/ 
crime/article228859984.html [https://perma.cc/QD9A-C4F9]. 
310. Jackman, supra note 309 (citing Professor John Worrall stating that claims of retaliation 
against police officers after disclosure of misconduct records are based on “a total lack of data”). 
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providing access to misconduct records statistically increases the likelihood of 
physical harm to officers, and thus this concern should hold little weight.311 
Lastly, police officers have in recent years repeatedly expressed concern that 
external oversight of police officers, which includes public access to misconduct 
records, will make officers reluctant to police “proactively.”312 As an attorney for a 
California police union argued, “Knowing internal investigations will be 
disclosed . . . could lead some officers to hesitate during violent confrontations, 
endangering their lives.”313  
Given the deeply concerning numbers of people who have been killed in 
recent years by officers who were quick to pull the trigger in what they erroneously 
perceived to be a threatening situation, a moment of hesitation before engaging in 
a violent confrontation may be a positive development.314 But even if one were to 
accept uncritically the argument that effective policing requires officers to act 
without hesitation, there is again no evidence to support the argument that public 
access to police misconduct records has any impact on daily police interactions or 
the effectiveness of patrol officers. Without additional (or any) evidence to support 
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Justice Department, CNN (May 18, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2016/09/20/us/oklahoma-tulsa-
police-shooting/index.html [https://perma.cc/C3CK-UL2R]; Anita Chabria et al.,  
‘There Is No Justice Yet.’ Six Months After Stephon Clark, Sacramento Still Seeks Answers,  
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CONCLUSION 
This Article examines the question that others have failed to ask: whether 
privacy doctrine supports officers’ claims of a right to privacy in their misconduct 
records. Although it may in limited circumstances, such as misconduct records 
containing medical or mental health information or involving instances of off-duty 
conduct that have no bearing on the officer’s fitness for his or her job, this Article 
ultimately concludes that privacy is overused as a justification for denying public 
access to misconduct records. 
Why, then, has privacy so long served as a legal basis for protecting 
misconduct records from disclosure? One implication, arising from Professor 
Solove’s explanation of privacy, is that privacy serves as “an issue of power; it is not 
simply the general expectations of society, but the product of a vision of the larger 
social structure.”315 This idea of privacy as a “vision of the larger social structure” 
may help explain why society has deferred for so many years to police officers’ 
assertions of a right to privacy in their misconduct records, with very little 
interrogation of whether privacy doctrine supports that right. The American social 
structure—and the legal system as a manifestation of that structure—is 
extraordinarily deferential to police officers, oftentimes at the expense of careful 
legal analysis or application.316 It is time to rethink that deference. 
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